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COMMENTS
WHAT ABOUT THE CHILDREN?
TOWARD AN EXPANSION OF LOSS OF




At common law, a husband had a separate cause of action for loss
of consortium with his wife when she was negligently injured.' The
concept of consortium signified the husband's right to "services, so-
ciety and sexual intercourse of the wife. ' 2 Most jurisdictions have
expanded the common law to also allow a wife to recover for loss of
consortium when her husband is injured.3
Prior to 1980, courts uniformly refused to recognize a child's
cause of action for loss of consortium of a negligently injured par-
ent.4 Courts generally identified four main justifications in refusing
* The author wishes to express thanks to the law firm of Eaton, McClellan & Allen, and
in particular David T. Smorodin, Esq., for assistance with this Comment.
1. See Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 20-23, 303 N.W.2d 424, 428-29 (1981) (Levin, J.,
dissenting) (providing history of loss of consortium cause of action).
2. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 124, at 874 (4th ed. 1971).
3. See Berger, 411 Mich. at 21, 303 N.W.2d at 429 (Levin,J., dissenting) (noting that loss
of consortium cause of action has been expanded to allow wife to recover and questioning
whether child should be permitted to bring similar cause of action).
4. See Early v. United States, 474 F.2d 756, 758 (9th Cir. 1973) (maintaining that
neither statute nor court decision in Alaska provides children of injured parent award for loss
of affection and services); Pleasant v. Washington Sand & Gravel Co., 262 F.2d 471,473 (D.C.
Cir. 1958) (believing any change in law regarding loss of consortium should be left to legisla-
ture); Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 453, 563 P.2d 858, 866, 138 Cal. Rptr.
302, 310 (1977) (en banc) (refusing to recognize child's cause of action for loss of parental
consortium due to inadequacy of monetary compensation to alleviate harm to child, difficulty
of measuring damages, and danger of imposing extended and disproportionate liability);
Hoffman v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, 169, 368 P.2d 57, 59-60 (1962) (noting that possibility of
multiplicity of actions and potential for double recovery to child are sufficient to prevent rec-
ognition of this cause of action); General Elec. Co. v. Bush, 88 Nev. 360, 368, 498 P.2d 366,
371 (1972) (refusing to recognize child's cause of action because of distinction between
mother's claim of loss of consortium with her husband and children's claim of loss of consor-
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to recognize this cause of action: (1) deference to the legislature to
make changes in the law; 5 (2) the belief that loss of parental consor-
tium was too intangible;6 (3) fear of an increase in litigation;7 and
(4) the concern of severe increases in defendant liabilities.8 Ironi-
cally, courts discounted these same arguments when expanding the
cause of action for loss of consortium to allow recovery to wives.
Over the past ten years, however, courts in several jurisdictions
have extended the common law cause of action for loss of consor-
tium to include claims for loss of parental consortium by children.' 0
tium with their father); Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 61 NJ. 501, 507, 295 A.2d 862, 864
(1972) (noting problems of remoteness and speculative nature of damage claims as reasons
for refusing to recognize cause of action).
5. See Jeune v. Del E. Webb Constr. Co., 77 Ariz. 226, 228, 269 P.2d 723, 724 (1954)
(holding that children do not have cause of action for loss of parental consortium because
court does not have power to change common law), overruled in Villareal v. State Dep't of
Transp., 160 Ariz. 474, 477, 774 P.2d 213, 216 (1989). Arizona courts have since changed
their position regarding their ability to change the common law. See Reben v. Ely, 146 Ariz.
309, 314, 705 P.2d 1360, 1365 (Ct. App. 1985) (recognizing parents' cause of action for loss
of consortium of their injured child). The court in Reben noted it is the judiciary's function,
not the legislature's, to change tort law. Id. at 311, 705 P.2d at 1362. The court reasoned that
tort law concerns "relations between parties," whereas the legislature's focus is the relation of
the state to its citizens. Id. at 311, 705 P.2d at 1362. Additionally, the court observed that
legislative inaction in an area did not represent legislative intent. Id. at 310, 705 P.2d at 1361.
But see General Elec. Co. v. Bush, 88 Nev. 360, 368, 498 P.2d 366, 371 (1972) (choosing to
await legislative action on issue of loss of parental consortium for children).
6. See Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 61 NJ. 502, 507, 295 A.2d 862, 864 (1972) (main-
taining that there is potential for problems of remoteness and uncertainty in damage claims
for loss of parental consortium).
7. See Hoffman v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, 169, 368 P.2d 57, 60 (1962) (holding that mi-
nor children could not recover for loss of their father's consortium). In Hoffman, the father
incurred brain damage as a result of a car accident. Id. at 166, 368 P.2d at 58. The court
refused to recognize the children's cause ofaction because it could give rise to potential litiga-
tion involving multiplicity of actions based on a single tort. Id. at 169, 368 P.2d at 60.
8. See Russell, 61 NJ. at 506, 295 A.2d at 864 (1972) (declaring that significant increase
of damage awards to single family based on one accident presents serious problem to particu-
lar defendant).
9. See generally Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 815-19 (D.C. Cir.) (refuting tradi-
tional reasons for not allowing wife to have cause of action for loss of consortium when hus-
band is negligently injured), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950), overruled on other grounds, Smith &
Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220 (1956) (concerning interpretation of Longshore and Harbor Work-
ers' Compensation Act).
10. See Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991, 997 (Alaska 1987) (hold-
ing that four minor children have independent cause of action for loss of parental consortium
as result of injuries suffered by their father in course of his employment); Ferriter v. Daniel
O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 516, 413 N.E.2d 690, 696 (1980) (allowing children to
receive damages for loss of consortium for father's negligent injury if child can demonstrate
dependence on parent); Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 17, 303 N.W.2d 424, 427 (1981) (al-
lowing minor daughter to receive damages for loss of society, companionship, love, and affec-
tion when mother was injured in automobile collision); Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463,
465-66 (Tex. 1990) (recognizing cause of action for loss of parental consortium and refusing
to limit right of recovery to minor children); Hay v. Medical Center Hosp., 145 Vt. 533, 545,
496 A.2d 939, 946 (1985) (allowing minor child to recover for loss of parental consortium
when mother was alive but permanently comatose as result of defendant's negligence); Ue-
land v. Reynolds Metals Co., 103 Wash. 2d 131, 140, 691 P.2d 190, 195 (1984) (recognizing
that two minor children could receive recovery for loss of love, care, companionship, and
guidance after father was tortiously injured by third party and suffered mental and physical
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Since the 1950s, the District of Columbia has not recognized this
cause of action and its courts have refused to consider the issue."
In light of the numerous courts in other jurisdictions that recently
have considered a child's cause of action for loss of consortium, Dis-
trict of Columbia courts are likely to face this issue in the next few
years.' 2 In fact, a case recently before the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals, Washington v. Washington Hospital Center,1
3
disabilities); Belcher v. Goins, 400 S.E.2d 830, 841 (W. Va. 1990) (permitting minor children
or handicapped children of any age who are physically, emotionally, and financially dependent
on their natural or adoptive parents to maintain cause of action for loss of parental consor-
tium); Theama v. City of Kenosha, 117 Wis. 2d 508, 527, 344 N.W.2d 513, 522 (1984) (al-
lowing minor children to recover for loss of parental consortium where father suffered severe
injuries to head and internal organs as result of motorcycle accident).
11. Pleasant v. Washington Sand & Gravel Co., 262 F.2d 471, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (re-
fusing to recognize child's loss of consortium claim). The court stated that the common law
did not offer the child an enforceable right to recover damages from either a parent or a third
party for the loss of personal care, affection, and companionship. Id. at 473; see Hill v. Sibley
Memorial Hosp., 108 F. Supp. 739, 739 (D.D.C. 1952) (noting absence of authority for grant-
ing recovery to child when parent is negligently injured).
12. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (indicating several jurisdictions that cur-
rently recognize child's cause of action for loss of parental consortium). In addition to the
cases recognizing a cause of action for loss of consortium, many other courts recently have
considered this issue. See Lewis v. Rowland, 287 Ark. 474, 479, 701 S.W.2d 122, 124-25
(1985) (holding that quadriplegic son who was dependent on services of his mother did not
have cause of action for loss of consortium when mother was injured in car accident); Borer v.
American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 453, 563 P.2d 858, 866, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 310
(1977) (denying nine children recovery for loss of parental consortium with mother who suf-
fered injuries when lighting fixture fell from ceiling); Zorzos v. Rosen, 467 So. 2d 305, 307
(Fla. 1985) (denying recovery to two minor children for loss of parental consortium with fa-
ther injured in automobile accident); Hoffman v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, 169, 368 P.2d 57, 60
(1962) (denying three minor children recovery for loss of parental consortium with father who
suffered brain damage and permanent disabilities due to automobile collision with defend-
ant); Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736, 742 (Minn. 1982) (refusing to allow recovery to
two minor children for loss of parental consortium with father who became quadriplegic as
result of automobile accident); Barbera v. Brod-Dugan Co., 770 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1989) (stating son could not recover for loss of parental consortium with father who
became quadriplegic during work related accident); General Elec. Co. v. Bush, 88 Nev. 360,
368,498 P.2d 366, 371 (1972) (denying children recovery for loss of parental consortium with
father who was severely injured at work); Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 61 N.J. 502, 506-08,
295 A.2d 862, 865 (1972) (maintaining that minor children do not have cause of action for
damages for deprivation of aid, comfort, companionship, loss of services, and earnings of
parent attributable to parent's injuries); DeAngelis v. Lutheran Med. Center, 84 A.D.2d 17,
19-20, 445 N.Y.S.2d 188, 191 (1981) (finding that in medical malpractice action, three minor
children could not recover for loss of consortium against alleged tortfeasor who negligently
inflicted injuries on mother), aft'd, 58 N.Y.2d 1053,449 N.E.2d 406,462 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1983);
Vaughn v. Clarkson, 324 N.C. 108, 111, 376 S.E.2d 236, 238 (1989) (refusing to recognize
child's cause of action for loss of parental consortium against third party whose alleged negli-
gence injured parent); Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 293 Or. 543, 568-69,
652 P.2d 318, 333 (1982) (holding that three-year-old child had no cause of action for loss of
parental consortium when mother suffered brain damage as result of defendant's negligence);
Steiner v. Bell Tel. Co., 358 Pa. Super. 505, 514, 517 A.2d 1348, 1357 (1986) (refusing to
grant recovery to two minor children for loss of parental consortium with mother who was
raped by intruder in home), aff'd, 518 Pa. 57, 87, 540 A.2d 266, 266 (1988); Still v. Baptist
Hosp., Inc., 755 S.W.2d 807, 815 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (refusing to allow minor daughter to
recover for loss of parental consortium with mother who suffered permanent mental and
physical disabilities caused by negligence of defendant).
13. 579 A.2d 177 (D.C. 1990).
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presented an opportunity for the District of Columbia to revisit this
issue.
The courts that have expanded the common law application of
loss of consortium refute the traditional reasons for refusing to rec-
ognize parental consortium claims.14 They acknowledged that a
child who loses the companionship and affection of a parent suffers
a loss similar to that of an adult deprived of spousal consortium.' 5
In addition, these courts recognized that in many jurisdictions
wrongful death statutes permit children to recover for loss of society
and companionship when a parent is killed negligently. 16 To these
14. See Leach v. Newport Yellow Cab, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 293, 303 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (re-
jecting arguments that child's cause of action for loss of parental consortium would increase
cost of insurance and that damages would be too speculative), aft'd, 815 F.2d 704 (6th Cir.
1987); Reighley v. International Playtex, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1078, 1084 (D. Colo. 1985) (al-
lowing children to recover for loss of consortium for alleged negligent death of mother where
child shows economic and emotional dependence on parent); Villareal v. State Dep't of
Transp., 160 Ariz. 474, 479-80, 774 P.2d 213, 218-19 (1989) (discrediting policy arguments
that child's loss of consortium claim would increase risk of double recovery, expand potential
scope of liability, and rejecting call to exercise judicial restraint); Ferriter v. Daniel
O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 515-16, 413 N.E.2d 690, 695 (1980) (noting that rea-
sons for denying recovery are unsound); Glicklich v. Spievack, 16 Mass. App. 488, 496, 452
N.E.2d 287, 292 (holding that nine-year-old son could receive damage award for loss of pa-
rental society and guidance as result of doctor's negligence when treating mother), appeal
denied, 390 Mass. 1103, 454 N.E.2d 1276 (1983); Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 16-17, 303
N.W.2d 424, 426 (1981) (refuting arguments that there are differences between marital and
parental relationships and that recognition of loss of consortium for children will result in
burden to individual defendant and to court system); Hay v. Medical Center Hosp., 145 Vt.
533, 545, 496 A.2d 939, 946 (1985) (stating that in interest ofjustice child must be given right
to sue for damages when defendant's tortious conduct left parent permanently comatose);
Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co., 103 Wash. 2d 135, 139-40, 691 P.2d 190, 195 (1984) (recog-
nizing child's cause of action for loss of parental consortium and stating that child need not be
minor).
15. See Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 510, 413 N.E.2d 690,
692 (1980) (comparing wife's interest in spousal consortium with child's interest in parental
consortium). The court in Ferriter expressed doubts that the child's interest in parental con-
sortium was less intense than the wife's interest in spousal consortium. Id. at 510, 413 N.E.2d
at 692.
16. See Reighley v. International Playtex, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1078, 1080 (D. Colo. 1985)
(discussing Colorado wrongful death statute). Reighley concerned a wrongful death case in
which the mother died of toxic shock syndrome. The court held, with certain limitations, that
a child has a recognized cause of action for loss of society and companionship of a parent. Id.
at 1084. Given that the husband and wife can sue for loss of consortium, the court stated that
a child may sue for the similar loss. Id. at 1081. The court noted that judicial recognition and
expansion of this cause of action is growing. Id. The fact that intangible losses have been
calculated in the past demonstrates that they can likewise be calculated here. Id. at 1082-83.
The court viewed compensation as a means to alleviate the child's grief and enable him to
function more easily. Id. at 1083. Although the court recognized that insurance costs may
increase, the court in Reighley reasoned that any increase is outweighed by society's benefit of
a well-adapted child. Id. Despite the court's expansion of the law of consortium, it placed
several limits on the child's cause of action. In order to bring suit, children are required to
join with the parent's action, if feasible, and demonstrate economic and emotional depen-
dency on the deceased parent. Id. at 1084; see Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 696
S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tex. 1985) (allowing children to recover for loss of parental consortium
when mother died after being hit by van in hotel parking lot). In Cavnar, the children sued for
damages under common law negligence, Texas wrongful death statute, and Texas survival
statute. Id. at 550. All the children received damages for loss of affection, comfort, compan-
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courts, logic compels a similar result when a parent is injured negli-
gently or intentionally. 17
This Comment examines whether the District of Columbia should
join other jurisdictions in allowing loss of consortium to benefit chil-
dren. Part I reviews the development of the concept of consortium
at common law. Next, Part II examines the status of the law regard-
ing loss of consortium in the District of Columbia. Part III provides
a discussion of Washington v. Washington Hospital Center and illustrates
the context in which a child's cause of action for loss of consortium
may arise. Part IV focuses on recent changes in the area of loss of
consortium pertaining to children. Furthermore, in order to deter-
mine whether the District of Columbia should re-examine the law of
loss of consortium and its application in today's society, this Com-
ment analyzes the arguments regarding expanding loss of consor-
tium to include children in Part V. Part VI offers a strategy for the
logistics of loss of parental consortium recovery. Finally, the Com-
ment concludes with a recommendation that the District of Colum-
bia rec6gnize the cause of action for children's loss of consortium.
I. BACKGROUND OF Loss OF CONSORTIUM
The origin of loss of consortium dates back to the 1600s when
courts first recognized that a husband had the right to recover for
ionship, society, emotional support, and love of the past and future, as well as $100,000 in
damages for past and future mental suffering. Id. The court in Cavnar stated that logic dic-
tates that all family members be treated equally when there is wrongful death. Id. at 551.
17. See Ferriterv. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 515-16, 413 N.E.2d 690,
695 (1980) (acknowledging need to protect children's expectation of parental consortium
when parent is negligently injured as well as when parent suffers death); Berger v. Weber, 411
Mich. 1, 15, 303 N.W.2d 424, 426 (1981) (identifying anomaly in legal system which permits
child to recover when parent dies, yet denies recovery when parent is seriously injured); Ue-
land v. Reynolds Metals Co., 103 Wash. 2d 131, 134, 691 P.2d 190, 192 (1984) (en banc)
(stating that child's loss of care, love, companionship, and guidance is nearly same whether
parent dies or is seriously injured).
In addition, numerous legal writers have argued that logic compels the recognition of a
child's cause of action for loss of parental consortium. See Love, Tortious Interference with the
Parent-Child Relationship: Loss of an Injured Person's Society and Companionship, 51 IND. LJ. 590,
634 (1976) [hereinafter Love, Tortious Interference with the Parent-Child Relationship] (failing to
find reasonable basis for allowing damages for loss of society and companionship when parent
or child is killed, yet denying recovery when parent or child is injured); Petrilli, A Child's Right
To Collect for Parental Consortium Where Parent Is Seriously Injured, 26 J. FAr. L. 317, 347 (1987-88)
[hereinafter Petrilli, A Child's Right To Collect] (concluding that both logic and public policy
should urge courts to act); Comment, The Child's Right To Sue for Loss of a Parent's Love, Care and
Companionship Caused by Tortious Injury to the Parent, 56 B.U.L. REv. 722, 741 (1976) [hereinafter
Comment, The Child's Right To Sue] (observing current inconsistency in law by allowing loss of
spousal consortium, yet denying loss of parental consortium); Comment, The Child's Claimfor
Loss of Consortium Damages: A Logical and Sympathetic Appeal, 13 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 231, 244
(1975) [hereinafter Comment, The Child's Claim] (noting that there are no significant reasons
for denying child's claim).
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the loss of his wife's domestic services.18 The husband's rights
evolved out of the structure of seventeenth-century domestic rela-
tionships.' 9 Under common law, the head of the household held a
recognized claim for interference with the master-servant relation-
ship.20 Additionally, the rights of all family members were assigned
to the head of the household, the father.21
The rationale for the husband's right to sue for loss of consortium
was that the common law equated wives and children with ser-
vants.22 Like the master-servant relationship, a husband's recovery
was restricted to the monetary value of his wife's services. 23
Although courts allowed the husband to seek compensation for the
loss of his wife's services, they refused to recognize a similar right to
the wife for loss of her husband's services. 24
Judicial recognition of the husband's right to receive compensa-
tion for loss of his wife's services laid the ground work for changes
in the common law.25 By the late nineteenth century, courts ex-
panded the common law by permitting the husband to recover for
18. See Guy v. Livesey, Cro. Jac. 501, 502, 79 Eng. Rep. 428, 428 (1619) (maintaining
husband's action was for his personal loss when wife was assaulted and that this action is
similar to one that master has for loss of servant's services); Young v. Pridd, Cro. Car. 89, 90,
79 Eng. Rep. 679, 679 (1627) (emphasizing husband's damages were recovered for loss sus-
tained while waiting for wife when she was assaulted and abducted for half year).
Loss of consortium is commonly thought of as loss of not only material services, but such
intangibles as society, guidance, companionship, and sexual relations in a marital relation-
ship. BLACK'S LAw DiCrIONARY 309 (6th ed. 1990). In the parent-child relationship, the term
consortium means the "loss of a parent's love, care, companionship and guidance ......
Comment, The Child's Right to Sue, supra note 17, at 723. The term "parental consortium"
refers to the latter definition.
19. See Note, Frank v. Superior Court: Purging the Law of Outdated Theories for Loss of Con-
sortium Recovery, 29 ARiz. L. REV. 541, 542 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Purging the Law] (main-
taining that husbands' loss of consortium claim stemmed from loss of services of wives and
children); Comment, The Child's Right to Sue, supra note 17, at 724 (stating that father could
bring cause of action if wrongdoing of another deprived him of services of wife and children).
20. PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTs § 125, at 931 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS]; see Comment, The Child's Right To Sue, supra note
17, at 724 (noting that under doctrine of paterfamilias, only father had cause of action for
injuries of family members because of proprietary interest).
21. See Comment, The Child's Right To Sue, supra note 17, at 724 (emphasizing lack of
recognition women and children received).
22. See id. (comparing husband's relationship with wife and children to master's relation-
ship with servant); Note, Purging the Law, supra note 19, at 542 (maintaining that male's claim
for interference with master-servant relationship is firmly rooted in history).
23. Comment, The Child's Right to Sue, supra note 17, at 724. The husband could also
recover for incidental expenses such as any medical costs incurred. Id.
24. See Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas. 577, 599, 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 863 (Ire. 1861) (refus-
ing to allow loss of consortium recovery to wife). In Lynch, the court reasoned that the hus-
band, as sole owner of all marital property, may recover damages in order to hire another
servant. Id. The wife, however, suffers only the loss of her husband's society and affection
which cannot be compensated. Id.
25. See Comment, The Child's Right to Sue, supra note 17, at 724 (discussing evolution of
cause of action for loss of consortium from its historical foundation based on loss of services
by husband).
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the loss of sentimental elements such as companionship, society,
and comfort.26 These sentimental elements soon became the domi-
nant theme for loss of consortium claims. 27 The loss of consortium
cause of action became one in which services formed only one com-
ponent.28 Eventually, courts even granted recovery for loss of con-
sortium to husbands where there was no showing of services
rendered or lost.29 Although the courts enlarged loss of consortium
recovery, the cause of action remained solely with the husband.30
In 1950, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit established the District of Columbia as the pio-
neering jurisdiction in the law of loss of consortium.3 1 In Hitaffer v.
26. See Denver Consol. Tramway Co. v. Riley, 14 Colo. App. 132, 139-40, 59 P. 476,
478-79 (1899) (emphasizing that although companionship and society of wife cannot be mea-
sured, compensation should be given). In Riley, the husband brought an action to recover
damages for loss of his wife's services, companionship, and society. Id. at 134, 59 P. at 476.
Mrs. Riley became permanently disabled when she was thrown to the ground due to the rail-
road's negligence. Id. at 134, 59 P. at 477. The Riley court stated that the husband was enti-
tled to receive compensation for the loss of his wife's love and companionship. Id. at 139-40,
59 P. at 479. The jury was to determine the compensation based upon the facts and circum-
stances of the case. Id.; see Furnish v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 102 Mo. 669, 676, 15 S.W. 315,
317 (1891) (allowing husband recovery for loss of wife's society and companionship). The
action in Furnish was also brought by a husband to recover damages sustained by him when his
wife was severely injured. Id. at 670, 15 S.W. at 316. The injury occurred when Mrs. Furnish
was a passenger on defendant's train which derailed. Id. As a result of the accident, Mrs.
Furnish was unable to walk. Id. at 671, 15 S.W. at 316. Over the objection of the defendant,
the court instructed the jury to compensate Mr. Furnish for the loss of society and compan-
ionship of his wife. Id. at 672, 15 S.W. at 316.
27. See Comment, The Child's Right to Sue, supra note 17, at 724 (noting lesser emphasis
placed on services element of consortium).
28. See Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 814 (D.C. Cir.) (emphasizing that consor-
tium is comprised of more than mere services of spouse), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950),
overruled on other grounds, Smith & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220 (1956) (overruling interpretation
of Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act). The court in Hitafer defined consor-
tium as not only "material services, [but] also ... love, affection, companionship, sexual rela-
tions, etc., all welded into a conceptualistic unity." Id.
29. See id. at 815 (commenting on cases where husbands' cause of action for loss of con-
sortium does not involve loss of services); see also PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 20,
§ 125, at 931-32 (outlining evolution of loss of consortium cause of action and eventual wide-
scale abandonment of services-based recovery).
30. See, e.g., Giggeyv. GallagherTransp. Co., 101 Colo. 258,260-61,72 P.2d 1100, 1101
(1937) (refusing to recognize wife's right to recover for loss of consortium when husband is
negligently injured and maintaining that wife already receives recovery when her husband is
awarded damages); Cravens v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 195 Ky. 257, 264, 242 S.W. 628,
632 (1922) (allowing wife to recover for loss of consortium of her husband due to intentional
wrong, yet denying recovery for merely negligent act); Kosciolek v. Portland Ry., Light &
Power Co., 81 Or. 517, 524, 160 P. 132, 133 (1916) (acknowledging that while husband could
maintain action for loss of consortium from injury or death to wife, wife could not maintain
identical cause of action for loss of consortium from husband to herself.
31. A long line of authority uniformly denied the wife recovery for loss of consortium
prior to Hitaffer. See Tyler v. Brown-Service Funeral Homes Co., 250 Ala. 295, 297, 34 So. 2d
203, 204-05 (1948) (refusing to grant recovery to wife who discovered her husband in a freez-
ing condition due to defendant's negligence in leaving her husband in unheated home);
Boden v. Del-Mar Garage, Inc., 205 Ind. 59, 72, 185 N.E. 860, 864 (1933) (holding that wife
has no cause of action for loss of consortium of her husband who sustained severe injuries
through third party's actions, even though injury was inflicted willfully and maliciously).
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Argonne Co. ,32 the court recognized a wife's cause of action for loss of
consortium that resulted from a negligent injury to her husband.33
The court concluded that the justifications for allowing only a hus-
band to recover for loss of consortium were unreasonable.3 4
In Hitaffer, the court addressed several arguments that are cur-
rently made against recognizing children's rights to seek recovery
for loss of parental consortium. At the outset, the court rejected the
argument that the wife's injuries were too indirect. Rather, the
court determined that "invasion of loss of consortium is an in-
dependent wrong directly to the spouse so injured. '3 5 Next, the
court rebutted the argument that the injuries of the wife are too
remote and inconsequential with two lines of reasoning. First, the
rule in negligence cases states that the wrongdoer is liable for inju-
ries produced, absent any intervening causes, that would not have
occurred but for the negligent act.36 Second, because damages to a
husband for sentimental elements of consortium are not too remote
and inconsequential, a wife's damages for sentimental elements
should likewise not be too remote and inconsequential.3 7
Aside from equating a wife's right to recover for loss of consor-
tium to that of her husband, the court in Hitaffer clarified the defini-
tion of consortium. Consortium stood not only for material
services, but also for love, affection, companionship, and sexual re-
lations.38 The court reasoned that the wife has a right to these "sen-
timental elements" and is thus afforded a remedy.39 Courts around
the country followed Hitaffer and recognized a wife's right to seek
damages for loss of consortium.40 In addition, courts have adopted
32. 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950).
33. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 816-19 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852
(1950), overruled on other grounds, Smith & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220 (1956) (overruling inter-
pretation of Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act). The court in Hitaffer
awarded damages to the wife when her husband sustained severe and permanent bodily inju-
ries as a result of defendant's negligence. Id.
34. See id, (holding that there is no rationale for allowing husband to assert action for
loss of consortium, yet denying wife protection of exact same interest).
35. Id. at 815.
36. See id. at 815 (stating that because wife's injuries from loss of consortium are not
foreseeable does not excuse wrongdoer for that which would not have occurred but for negli-
gent act).
37. See id (commenting that if remoteness of injuries were valid reason for denying wife
recovery, then husband also has no basis for cause of action).
38. See id. at 813 (stating that material services do not predominate over companionship,
love, felicity, and sexual relations as element of consortium).
39. Id.
40. See Duffy v. Lipsman-Fulkerson & Co., 200 F. Supp. 71, 74 (D. Mont. 1961) (main-
taining that wife is entitled to recovery for loss of support, companionship, and affection of
husband when injury results from negligence of third person); Missouri-Pacific Transp. Co. v.
Miller, 227 Ark. 351, 364, 299 S.W.2d 41, 48-49 (1957) (announcing that reason and justice
require wife to recover for loss of consortium when husband was rendered totally disabled in
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the Hitaffer description of consortium as encompassing not only ma-
terial services, but also the sentimental elements of love and
companionship. 4 1
II. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA LAW REGARDING Loss OF CONSORTIUM
IN THE PARENT-CHILD CONTEXT
District of Columbia courts confronted another novel loss of con-
sortium issue two years after Hitaffer in Hill v. Sibley Memorial Hospi-
tal.42 In Hill, the claim for loss of consortium arose in the context of
the parent-child relationship.43 The United States District Court for
the District of Columbia acknowledged that when a parent is negli-
gently injured, the child suffers an unobjectionable loss: the love
and companionship of a parent.44 Although the court recognized
the child's loss, it refused to extend consortium law to permit a re-
covery. 45 The court observed that "a lower court should be cau-
tious in laying down a completely new rule ....- 46
Six years after Hill, the loss of consortium issue in the parent-
child context confronted the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. In Pleasant v. Washington Sand & Gravel
Co.,47 the Court of Appeals held that a child has no enforceable right
to damages for loss of personal care, affection, and companionship
when a third party has destroyed the family relationship by negli-
bus collision); Bailey v. Wilson, 100 Ga. App. 405, 408, 111 S.E.2d 106, 108 (1959) (recogniz-
ing that wife of man injured in automobile collision has cause of action for loss of consor-
tium); Brown v. Georgia-Tennessee Coaches, Inc., 88 Ga. App. 519, 529, 77 S.E.2d 24, 31
(1953) (holding that wife has cause of action for loss of consortium due to negligent injury to
her husband); Burk v. Anderson, 232 Ind. 77, 80-81, 109 N.E.2d 407, 408 (1952) (allowing
widow to recover for loss of husband's support, society, and maintenance from owners of
tavern who sold intoxicating liquors to her husband); Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 280, 78
N.W.2d 480, 485-86 (1956) (finding logic in Hitafer sound and granting wife recovery for loss
of consortium when husband was permanently disabled in automobile collision); Montgomery
v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 49, 101 N.W.2d 227, 235 (1960) (holding that wife may maintain
action for loss of consortium with husband who was involved in automobile collision due to
defendant's negligence).
41. See Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 36, 101 N.W.2d 227, 228 (1960) (defining
consortium as "love, companionship, affection, society, comfort, sexual relations, services,
solace.., and more").
42. 108 F. Supp. 739 (D.D.C. 1952).
43. Hill v. Sibley Memorial Hosp., 108 F. Supp. 739, 740 (D.D.C. 1952) (examining
whether law should be extended to allow children to recover damages for loss of consortium
of parent due to negligence of another).
44. Id. at 741.
45. Id. (observing that although common law should continually be reappraised to meet
changing needs of society, lower courts should respect prior holdings of appellate courts).
46. See id. (confessing that it has been difficult on basis of natural justice to conclude that
this cause of action will not be recognized, but noting that this court should not be one to
initiate any change in doctrine).
47. 262 F.2d 471 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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gently injuring the child's parent.48 The court distinguished this
case from Hitaffer by stating that the holding in Hitaffer was based on
a right arising out of a marital relationship.49
The court in Pleasant based its decision on a narrow reading of
Hitaffer and ignored Hitaffer's broad description of the elements
comprising consortium. 50 In fact, Hitaffer encompassed much more
than granting a wife the right to recover for loss of consortium be-
cause her husband had such a remedy.51 The court in Hitaffer broke
from the common law tradition of denying the wife a right to loss of
consortium recovery and made a step-by-step analysis of the justifi-
cations for allowing recovery to a wife for loss of consortium. 52 In
addition, Hitaffer set out a clear framework for the meaning of loss of
consortium.53 In Pleasant, the court failed to use the framework
presented in Hitaffer to analyze the soundness of a child's consor-
tium claim. 54 Instead, it followed the custom of denying a remedy
48. Pleasant v. Washington Sand & Gravel Co., 262 F.2d 471, 472-73 (D.C. Cir. 1958)
(recognizing difference between marital relationship and parent-child relationship).
49. Id. at 472.
50. Compare Pleasant, 262 F.2d at 472 (noting that decision in Hitaffer was based solely on
marriage relationship) with Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 814 (D.C. Cir.) (illuminat-
ing all elements of consortium and naming sexual relations as only one component), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950), overruled on other grounds, Smith & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220
(1956) (overruling interpretation of Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act). In
Hitaffer, the court stated that "[t]here is more to consortium than the mere services of the
spouse. Beyond that there are the so-called sentimental elements to which the wife has a right
for which there should be a remedy." Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 814 (emphasis in original).
51. See Brief for Appellant at 21, Washington v. Washington Hosp. Center, 579 A.2d 177
(D.C. 1990) (No. 89-829) [hereinafter "Brief for Appellant"] (asserting that Hitaffer opinion
provides valuable tool to analyze issue of whether other family members should have recog-
nized cause of action for loss of consortium and noting that it is undisputable that family
members, children in particular, suffer injuries similar to interests protected under Hitaffer
court's portrayal of consortium).
52. Compare Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 819 (D.C. Cir.) (becoming first court
to recognize wife's cause of action), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950), overruled on other grounds,
Smith & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220 (1956) (overruling interpretation of Longshore and Har-
bor Workers' Compensation Act) with Pleasant v. Washington Sand & Gravel Co., 262 F.2d
471, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (deferring recognition of child's cause of action for loss of parental
consortium to the legislature).
Not only did the District of Columbia Circuit expand common law in Hitaffer in 1950, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals recently expanded it again in the context of emotional
distress. See Williams v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062, 1064 (D.C. 1990) (departing from common
law rule that there can be no recovery for emotional distress as result of negligent act unless
such distress was product of direct and substantial physical injury caused by action). Instead,
the court in Williams applied a zone of danger test and permitted recovery for emotional dis-
tress caused by witnessing injury to an immediate family member, providing the witness also
feared for his or her own safety. Id. at 1066-67.
53. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text (noting many components of
consortium).
54. See Pleasant v. Washington Sand & Gravel Co., 262 F.2d 471, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1958)
(reasoning that common law did not recognize child's claim for damages for "loss of personal
care, affection, and companionship" from either parent or third party).
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to children who have suffered the loss of their parents. 55
The court in Pleasant concluded by stating that there is "no trend
in the law at the present time in favor of recognizing new rights in
children." 56 While true in 1958, that statement does not hold true
today.57 Courts continue to recognize the rights of children to re-
cover for loss of consortium.5 8 In the intervening thirty-two years,
however, the District of Columbia courts have not addressed the is-
sue put forth in Pleasant.59
III. WASHINGTON V. WASHINGTON HOSPITAL CENTER
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals was presented with an
opportunity to evaluate the issue presented in Pleasant. Washington
v. Washington Hospital Center,60 a medical malpractice case, involved
claims by the children of LaVerne Alice Thompson, who underwent
elective surgery requiring general anesthesia at the Washington
55. Id. at 473 (noting absence of "trend" in law at present recognizing new rights in
children and asserting that Congress should make any change).
56. Id
57. See, e.g., NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,347-48 (1985) (protecting students from
unreasonable searches and seizures by school officials); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584
(1975) (asserting that students confronted with possible suspension have right to notice and
hearing); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (maintaining that when juvenile is charged
with act that would constitute crime if committed by adult, due process requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969) (establish-
ing students' right to expression of opinion by declaring regulation prohibiting wearing of
armbands to school to exhibit disapproval of Vietnam War unconstitutional); In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 41-48 (1967) (announcing that juvenile has sixth amendment rights to counsel, con-
frontation, cross-examination, and fifth amendment right against self-incrimination); Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (providing black children right to equal educational
opportunity); The United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child, 14 U.N. GAOR Annex
(Agenda Item 64) at 16-17, U.N. Doc. A/4299 (1959), reprinted in A. WILKERSON, THE RIGHTS
OF CHILDREN: EMERGENT CONCEPTS IN LAW AND SOCIETY 3-6 (1974) [hereinafter RIGrTS OF
CHILDREN: EMERGENT CONCEPTS]. Principle two of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child
states:
The child shall enjoy special protection, and shall be given opportunities and facili-
ties, by law and by other means, to enable him to develop physically, mentally, mor-
ally, spiritually and socially in a healthy and normal manner and in conditions of
freedom and dignity. In the enactment of laws for this purpose the best interests of
the child shall be the paramount consideration.
Id. at 4; see also Coughlin, The Rights of Children, in RIGHTS OF CHILDREN: EMERGENT CONCEPTS
7, 22 (emphasizing human rights are based on being human person and children are equally
deserving of these rights as adults); Drinan, The Rights of Children in Modern American Family
Law, in RIGHTS OF CHILDREN: EMERGENT CONCEPTS 37, 45 (stating that whenever courts must
make decision affecting life and future of children, primary objective should be rights of all
children to economic, educational, and emotional stability); H. COHEN, EQUAL RIGHTS FOR
CHILDREN 1, 133 (1980) (advocating equal rights for children because justice requires it and
noting that children deserve respect and one method of demonstrating respect is to treat
people justly).
58. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (noting trend of recognizing children's fight
to loss of consortium recovery).
59. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (providing history of loss of parental
consortium cases in District of Columbia since 1952).
60. 579 A.2d 177 (D.C. 1990).
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Hospital Center.61 One issue on appeal was whether Mrs. Thomp-
son's two children could recover for loss of consortium with their
mother.62
Prior to the surgery, a nurse-anesthetist, under the supervision of
an anesthesiologist, inserted an endotracheal tube into Mrs.
Thompson's throat to permit oxygen to flow to the anesthetized pa-
tient during surgery.63 In the lawsuit, the plaintiffs6 asserted that
the nurse-anesthetist mistakenly placed the tube in Mrs. Thomp-
son's esophagus, just above the stomach. 65 The plaintiffs alleged
that as a result of this error and the Washington Hospital Center's
failure to have proper monitors in place to detect this error, Mrs.
Thompson did not receive sufficient oxygen during surgery and suf-
fered a cardiac arrest. 66 Although she was resuscitated, Mrs.
Thompson suffered "catastrophic brain injuries. ' 67
Mrs. Thompson is now in a permanent vegetative state.68 Experts
testified that she is " 'essentially awake but unaware' of her sur-
roundings."6 9 Although Mrs. Thompson may live for another ten to
twenty years, doctors do not anticipate any change in her
condition.7 0
Mrs. Thompson's family filed suit on her behalf in the District of
Columbia Superior Court in December 1987.71 In addition to the
normal medical malpractice claims, the complaint included claims
for loss of consortium on behalf of Mrs. Thompson's two children,
nineteen-year-old Toyia Green and seven-year-old Devin Michelle
Thompson.7 2
Prior to trial, the defendants moved for summary judgment on
the children's loss of consortium claims.73 On August 3, 1988,
61. Washington v. Washington Hosp. Center, 579 A.2d 177, 179-80 (D.C. 1990).
62. Brief for Appellant, supra note 51, at 18.
63. Washington Hosp. Center, 579 A.2d at 180.
64. IA The plaintiffs consisted of LaVerne Alice Thompson's entire family: her mother,
her two daughters, and her husband. Id.







71. Id. at 71. Alma D. Washington, Mrs. Thompson's mother, filed a medical malprac-
tice suit individually as conservator of LaVerne Alice Thompson's estate. Id. Mrs. Washing-
ton filed suit in her individual capacity, with Mrs. Thompson's two daughters, Toyia I. Green
and Devin Michelle Thompson, and Mrs. Thompson's estranged husband, Michael L.
Thompson. All four co-petitioners sought damages for loss of consortium with Mrs. Thomp-
son. Id.
72. Id.
73. Memorandum and Order, Washington v. Associated Anesthesiologist Servs., P.C.,
118
1991] EXPANSION OF Loss OF CONSORTIUM RECOVERY 119
Judge Greene of the District of Columbia Superior Court granted
the defendant's motion. 74 Judge Greene wrote that while prior case
law dictated his actions, "the loss to a child of a parent's companion-
ship and care represents something which is valuable, precious, and
quantifiable .... ,,75 Judge Greene stated that, were it not for the
binding prior decisional law in this jurisdiction, the court would al-
low the plaintiffs to present their causes of action for loss of consor-
tium with their mother.76
The medical malpractice case proceeded to trial against the Wash-
ington Hospital Center.77 The jury awarded Mrs. Thompson
$4,586,278 and awarded Mr. Thompson $63,000.78 Both the Wash-
ington Hospital Center and the plaintiffs filed notices of appeal to
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. 79 On August 3, 1990, a
three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
judgments.80
The Court of Appeals dispensed with plaintiffs' appeal on the loss
of consortium issue in a single paragraph.8 ' The court noted that
the parties had agreed that District of Columbia precedent, Pleasant
v. Washington Sand & Gravel Co.,82 foreclosed such consortium
Civil Action No. 10616-87, at 1 (Aug. 3, 1988) (maintaining that case law did not recognize
plaintiffs' cause of action).
74. Id. at 2-3.
75. Id. at 3 n.1. Judge Greene stated that loss of parental consortium is quantifiable "at
least to the extent that other kinds of recovery permitted by tort law are quantifiable ...." Id.
He also noted that loss of parental consortium is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of an
injury to a parent. Id. To permit a child to recover in wrongful death action, yet deny recov-
ery for loss of care and services when the parent is disabled in the case at hand makes no
logical sense. Id.
76. Id.; cf. D.C. CODE AN. § 16-2701 (1981) (allowing recovery for pecuniary damages
to spouse and next of kin of decedent); Doe v. Binker, 492 A.2d 857, 863 (D.C. 1985) (identi-
fying two elements of recovery under Wrongful Death Act as (1) compensation for pecuniary
loss and (2) compensation for value of services lost to family as result of decedent's death).
Judge Greene stated that any distinction between a wrongful death action and the case at bar
is illusionary. Memorandum and Order, Washington v. Associated Anesthesiologist Servs.,
P.C., Civil Action No. 10616-87, at 3-4 n.1 (Aug. 3, 1988). Mrs. Thompson is in a vegetative
state which is likely to continue for the rest of her life. Id. at 3 n.1.
77. Washington v. Washington Hosp. Center, 579 A.2d 177, 180 (D.C. 1990). Several of
the original defendants were dismissed. Id. The anesthesiologist, the nurse-anesthetist, and
their employer settled midway through the trial. Id.
78. Memorandum and Order, Washington v. Associated Anesthesiologist Servs., P.C.,
Civil Action No. 10616-87, at 1 (Jan. 5, 1989). Mr. Thompson's loss of consortium claims
were limited to claims for lost services in caring for the couple's daughter, Devin Michelle
Thompson. Id.
79. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 51, at 18 (appealing issues concerning loss of con-
sortium claims); Brief for Appellee at 15, Washington v. Washington Hosp. Center, 579 A.2d
177 (D.C. 1990) (No. 89-829) (appealing issues unrelated to this Comment).
80. Washington v. Washington Hosp. Center, 579 A.2d 177, 179 (D.C. 1990). The case
was presented before Chief Judge Rogers and Associate Judges, Steadman and Farrell. Id.
Judge Farrell wrote the opinion. Id.
81. Id. (stating that it was bound by precedent that barred loss of consortium claims).
82. 262 F.2d 471 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:107
claims.8 3 The court cited M.A.P. v. Ryan,84 which held that a divi-
sion of the court cannot overrule binding precedent.85 Instead, the
entire en banc court is necessary to overrule a prior decision.8 6
After the court's decision on August 3, 1990, the plaintiffs filed a
motion seeking to sever their appeal from that of the Washington
Hospital Center so that they might file a motion to seek the full
court's review of the consortium issue.8 7 The motion was granted
on January 11, 1991.88 The plaintiffs then proceeded to file a Mo-
tion for Rehearing En Banc on January 18, 1991.89 The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals requested the Washington Hospital
Center to file a brief in opposition to the plaintiffs' motion for re-
hearing. 90 The court subsequently denied plaintiffs' Motion for Re-
hearing En Banc.
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ACROSS THE COUNTRY
Case law expanding actions for loss of consortium remains mini-
mal.9 1 Nevertheless, there are eight states that currently recognize a
83. Washington Hosp. Center, 579 A.2d at 179 n.1. The court stated that Pleasant v. Wash-
ington Sand & Gravel Co., as controlling law in the District of Columbia, forecloses a cause of
action for loss of parental consortium recovery. Id.
84. 285 A.2d 310 (D.C. 1971).,
85. M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C. 1971). OnJuly 29, 1970, Congress enacted
the District of Columbia Court Reform Act of 1970 (the Act), which established the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals as the highest court in the District of Columbia. Id. The Act
became effective on February 1, 1971. Id. It extinguished the power of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to review decisions of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals. Id. After the enactment of the Act, all District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals decisions are only reviewable by the Supreme Court of the United States according to
28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1988). Id.
Given that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals became the highest court for the
District of Columbia on February 1, 1971, the decisions of the United States Court ofAppeals
after that date do not restrict it. Id. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals recognized
that decisions rendered prior to February 1, 1971 comprise the case law of the District of
Columbia and, therefore, established that no division of the Court of Appeals can ignore a
decision of the United States Court of Appeals prior to February 1, 1971. Id. The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals is composed of nine judges who sit in divisions of three. Id. at
312 n.ll. To overrule a prior decision of the court or refuse to follow a decision of the
United States Court of Appeals, the entire en banc court is required. Id. at 312.
86. Id. at 312.
87. Motion to Sever Consolidated Appeals and for an Extension of Time in Which to File
a Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Washington v. Washington Hosp. Center, No. 89-829 (D.C.
Jan. 11, 1990).
88. Order, Washington v. Washington Hosp. Center, Nos. 89-829 & 89-830 (D.C. Jan.
11, 1991).
89. Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Washington v. Washington Hosp. Center, No. 89-
829 (D.C. Jan. 18, 1990).
90. Order, Washington v. Washington Hosp. Center, 579 A.2d 177 (D.C.Jan. 25, 1991)
(No. 89-829).
91. See Petrilli, A Child's Right to Collect, supra note 17, at 317 n.1 (observing only mini-
mum number of courts have allowed action and that as of 1987, 22 states had refused to
recognize child's loss of consortium action, leaving 22 states to address issue in future).
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child's cause of action for loss of parental consortium. 92 For these
states, the expansion of loss of consortium recovery was basically a
move from the narrow view of loss of consortium, with its focus on
sexual relations and the marital relationship, to a broader view en-
compassing the modern components of consortium such as society
and companionship. 93 Among these eight states, Massachusetts,
Michigan, and Washington best exemplify the expansion. 94
In 1980, the SupremeJudicial Court of Massachusetts became the
first state court to grant children the right to recover for loss of con-
sortium. 95 In Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc. ,96 a work-related
accident caused Ferriter to be paralyzed from the neck down.97 The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the two minor
children could recover for loss of parental consortium with their fa-
ther.98 The court acknowledged that a child who loses a parent's
companionship and affection suffers a loss comparable to that suf-
fered by an adult who loses spousal consortium.9 9 Because Massa-
chusetts allows children to recover for loss of parental society in
wrongful death actions, the Ferriter court concluded that the child's
expectation of parental society should likewise be protected when
the parent is negligently injured.1 0 0 The Supreme Judicial Court of
92. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (identifying Alaska, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Texas, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin as states that recognize
child's right to loss of consortium recovery). d
93. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (listing cases that recognize capacity of con-
sortium to encompass other family members).
94. See infra notes 95-122 and accompanying text (discussing cases in states that grant
child's cause of action).
95. Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 516, 413 N.E.2d 690, 696
(1980).
96. 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690 (1980).
97. Ferriter, 381 Mass. at 508, 413 N.E.2d at 691. Mr. Ferriter was seriously injured while
working as a carpenter for the defendant. Id. A one- to two-hundred pound load of wood
beams fell approximately fifty feet, and at least one hit him in the neck. Id. As a result of the
accident, Mr. Ferriter was hospitalized and became paralyzed from the neck down. Id. at 509,
413 N.E.2d at 691. The plaintiffs were his wife and two children, ages five and three. Id. at
508, 413 N.E.2d at 691.
98. Id. at 516, 413 N.E.2d at 696 (reasoning that children have viable claim if there is
proof of dependence on parent).
99. See id. at 510, 413 N.E.2d at 692 (stating that child's interest is no less intense than
wife's).
100. See id., at 515, 413 N.E.2d at 695 (citing Massachusetts General Law ch. 229, sec. 2,
stating that children are entitled to recover for "loss of the reasonably expected ... society...
of the decedent"); see also Glicklich v. Spievack, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 488, 496-98, 452 N.E.2d
287, 292-93 (awarding damages to patient's son for loss of parental consortium suffered as
result of doctor's negligence), appeal denied, 390 Mass. 1103, 454 N.E.2d 1276 (1983). In
Glicklich, a mother brought a medical malpractice claim because her doctor failed to diagnose
the breast cancer which led to the spreading of the cancer to her brain thereby reducing her
chances of survival. Id. at 490-91, 452 N.E.2d at 289-90. The court awarded her nine-year-
old son damages for loss of parental society because he is living in the injured parent's house-
hold and is dependent on her for guidance and support. Id. at 496, 452 N.E.2d at 292. The
court emphasized the fact that the mother played a significant role in her son's daily life and
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Massachusetts discounted the argument that this change in the law
should be left to the legislature. 10 The court reasoned that since
loss of consortium was a judicially created doctrine, courts should
also be the instrument of any change in this area of law.102
One year later in Berger v. Weber, s03 Michigan joined Massachusetts
in expanding common law loss of consortium. In Berger, the child's
mother sustained severe and permanent psychological and physical
injuries due to an automobile collision.'0 4 The Supreme Court of
Michigan held that a child may recover for loss of a parent's society
and companionship caused by negligent injury to the parent. 0 5
Although the Michigan court was confronted with a lack of prece-
dent, it did not retreat from what it saw as its duty to adjudicate this
claim.' 0 6 The court in Berger stated that it refused to continue to
treat children as "second class citizens."' 07 The court rejected the
argument that the difference between the spousal relationship and
the parent-child relationship demanded different legal treatment,
noting that sexual relations are only one aspect of a spousal consor-
tium claim10 8
The Michigan court did acknowledge that recognition of the new
cause of action might increase litigation. 0 9 The court, however,
noted that recovery was justifiable on this basis. Id. Recovery was not contingent upon
whether the child was financially dependent on his mother. Id.
101. See Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 516, 413 N.E.2d 690,
695-96 (1980) (stating reform can be accomplished without involving legislature) (quoting
Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass. 153, 166-67, 302 N.E.2d 555, 563 (1973)).
102. Id.
103. 411 Mich. 1, 303 N.W.2d 424 (1981).
104. Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 11, 303 N.W.2d 424, 424 (1981). Plaintiff, Wayne
Berger, sought damages on behalf of his minor daughter, Denise, for the loss of parental
consortium of her mother Christine Berger. Id.
105. Id. at 17, 303 N.W.2d at 427.
106. See id. at 12, 303 N.W.2d at 425 (asserting that lack of precedent cannot dispense
with responsibility for adjudicating each claim); see also Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33,
38, 101 N.W.2d 227, 229 (1960) (stating "[o]ur oath is to do justice, not to perpetuate
error").
107. Berger, 411 Mich. at 17, 303 N.W.2d at 427. The court stated that the importance of
children to our society deserves more than "lip service." Id.; see Comment, The Child's Claim,
supra note 17, at 238 n.38 (stating children have traditionally been regarded as chattels of
family and wards of state) (citing Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 HARV. EDUc. REv. 487,
489 (1973)).
108. Berger, 411 Mich. at 14-15, 303 N.W.2d at 426. The court noted that the distinction
between the spouse's action and the child's action was not significant enough to deny the
child's claim. Id. at 14, 303 N.W.2d at 426. The court observed that sexual relations was the
only element of a spouse's consortium that differed from the child's claim for loss of parental
consortium. Id. All other elements---"love, companionship, affection, society, comfort, serv-
ices, and solace-are similar in both relationships and in each are deserving of protection."
Id.; see Love, Tortious Interference with the Parent-Child Relationship, supra note 17, at 615 (noting
that it should be totally irrelevant that spouses are able to recover for loss of sexual relations).
109. Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 14, 303 N.W.2d 424, 426 (1981) (recognizing that
new class of plaintiffs would be created).
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chose to judge the case on its merits rather than by "engaging in
gloomy speculation as to where it will all end.""10 Like the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Ferriter, the Michigan court saw a
serious injustice in allowing a child to recover for loss of a parent's
society and companionship when a parent dies, but denying recov-
ery when a parent is injured."'
The court in Berger refused to succumb to the economic argument
that recognition of the child's claim would significantly raise insur-
ance premiums.1 2 The court reasoned that allowing children to re-
cover immediate compensation for their losses benefits society
because the recovery will help such children become emotionally
stable. 113 In the long run, the court observed, this benefit out-
weighs any potential increases in insurance premiums." 14
Finally, the court in Berger did not choose to leave this matter to
the legislature. 115 Judicial decisions, not legislative action, pre-
vented awards for the loss of parental consortium. Accordingly, it
was the court's task to remove this barrier."16
In 1984, the Supreme Court of Washington recognized the child's
right to loss of consortium recovery in the case of Ueland v. Reynolds
Metals Co. 117 In Ueland, two children sought recovery for loss of pa-
rental consortium with their father. 18 Like Mr. Ferriter, Mr. Ueland
was injured during the course of his employment and suffered se-
vere and permanent mental and physical impairment. 19 The Wash-
ington Supreme Court held that children have a separate cause of
action for loss of parental consortium when a parent is injured
through the negligence of another. 120 Although Ueland dealt with
the claims of two minor children, the court specifically stated that a
110. Id. at 15, 303 N.W.2d at 426 (following same rationale that Michigan Court of Ap-
peals applied in 1978 when it held that child may maintain cause of action for loss of parental
society and companionship when parent is "severely" injured).
111. See id. (noting anomaly in law).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. (claiming societal benefit will offset increase in insurance).
115. Id. at 17, 303 N.W.2d at 427 (noting that actions for loss of spousal consortium and
actions by parents for loss of child's services were created and developed by judiciary, not
legislature).
116. Id. (reasoning that child's cause of action for loss of parental consortium is not so
complex to warrant deferring it to legislature).
117. 103 Wash. 2d 131, 691 P.2d 190 (1984).
118. Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co., 103 Wash. 2d 131, 132, 691 P.2d 190, 191 (1984).
The Uelands were separated and in the process of seeking a divorce when the accident oc-
curred. Id. Mrs. Ueland brought this action on behalf of her children for loss of parental
consortium with their father. Id.
119. See id (noting that Mr. Ueland's injuries occurred when he was struck by metal cable
while working for Seattle City Light).
120. Id. at 140, 691 P.2d at 195.
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child is not required to be a minor or dependent on the injured
parent to recover.1 21 The court did, however, limit the child's claim
by requiring that children's claims for loss of parental consortium
be joined with the injured parent's claim whenever possible.' 22
Like the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit, the Supreme Court of Washington first addressed the
issue of parental consortium in a 1958 case, Erhardt v. Havens.1 23
Similarly, the court in Erhardt, like the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit, refused to adopt this
cause of action.1 24 The court observed that no other jurisdiction
recognized a child's cause of action for loss of consortium.1 25 In
fact, the Washington state courts did not even permit a wife's cause
121. Id. at 139-40, 691 P.2d at 195. The court chose to maintain consistency with the
policy in wrongful death actions that allows recovery for loss of parental consortium to chil-
dren that are not minors. Id. at 140, 691 P.2d at 195; see Kramer v. Portland-Seattle Auto
Freight, Inc., 43 Wash. 2d 386, 397, 261 P.2d 692, 698 (1953) (noting that wrongful death
recovery to children does not necessarily end with arrival of age of majority).
Some courts, however, recognizing the child's cause of action for loss of parental consor-
tium to the child, limit recovery to minor children dependent on the parent. See, e.g., Weitl v.
Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259, 270 (Iowa 1981) (limiting damages to period during which child is
minor); Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 516, 413 N.E.2d 690, 696
(1980) (maintaining that loss of parental consortium recovery is permissible upon showing
that children are minors and dependent on parent); Theama v. City of Kenosha, 117 Wis. 2d
508, 527, 344 N.W.2d 513, 518 (1984) (holding that minor child may recover for loss oflove,
care, society, companionship, protection, training, and guidance of parent due to negligence
of third party).
122. Ueland, 103 Wash. 2d at 137, 691 P.2d at 194. The court acknowledged that the
number of claims could equal the number of children of the injured parent. Id. at 136, 691
P.2d at 193. A number of courts have denied the child's cause of action for this very reason.
SeeJuene v. Del E. Webb Constr. Co., 77 Ariz. 226, 228, 269 P.2d 723, 724 (1954) (arguing
that law has never allowed for multiple actions to be brought by each member of family for
negligent injury to father); Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 444, 563 P.2d
858, 864, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 304 (1977) (asserting that if all nine children were permitted to
bring independent causes of action for loss of parental consortium, tort liability of defendant
would significantly multiply); Hoffman v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, 169, 368 P.2d 57, 59-60
(1962) (noting that recognition of such cause of action would have far-reaching results, in-
cluding multiplicity of actions based on single tort); Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 61 NJ. 502,
506, 295 A.2d 862, 864 (1972) (stating that allowance of minor child's claim would result in
substantial increase of liability against wrongdoer arising out of one occurrence).
In Ueland, the court chose to adopt the Iowa Supreme Court's solution to the problem of
multiplicity of litigation. Ueland, 103 Wash. 2d at 137, 691 P.2d at 193-94; see Weitl v. Moes,
311 N.W.2d 259, 270 (Iowa 198 1) (requiring child's claim for loss of parental consortium be
joined with injured parent's claim whenever feasible or, if claim is brought separately, burden
will be placed on child plaintiff to explain why joinder is not possible).
123. 53 Wash. 2d 103, 330 P.2d 1010 (1958). In Erhardt, two minor children sought re-
covery for loss of parental consortium with their mother. Erhardt v. Havens, Inc., 53 Wash.
2d 103, 103, 330 P.2d 1010, 1010 (1958). Their mother was permanently paralyzed due to
the negligence of the defendant hospital. Id. at 103-04, 330 P.2d at 1010. In addition, the
mother lost all of her mental capabilities and could no longer recognize her children. Id. at
104, 330 P.2d at 1010.
124. See id. at 106, 330 P.2d at 1012 (noting that legal guardian of minor children can
maintain action in his own name and recover damages claimed by children).
125. See id. (rejecting claim that it should set precedent).
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of action for loss of spousal consortium.1 26 The Erhardt court indi-
cated that when confronted with the "proper case," it would be will-
ing to recognize the action for parental consortium.' 27
Twenty-one years later, a Washington state court revisited the is-
sue in Roth v. Bell.' 28 In deciding Roth, the Washington Court of
Appeals followed Erhardt and declined to recognize the cause of ac-
tion. 129 The intermediate appellate court held that this matter
should be left to the legislature.' 30
The Washington State Supreme Court overruled the court of ap-
peals in Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co. 131 The supreme court noted
that case law subsequent to Erhardt expanded the consortium theory
of recovery.' 32 Accordingly, the court recognized that adoption of
the child's cause of action was indeed appropriate, if not long
overdue.13 3
126. Id.; see Ash v. S.S. Mullen, Inc., 43 Wash. 2d 345, 346-47, 261 P.2d 118, 118-19
(1953) (refusing to allow recovery to wife of worker for loss of consortium due to employer's
negligence because action was not permitted at common law or conferred by statute and
Worker's Compensation Act bars such action), overruled in Lundgren v. Whitney's, Inc., 94
Wash. 2d 91, 92, 614 P.2d 1272, 1273 (1980) (en banc) (holding that wife could claim dam-
ages for loss of consortium when husband is injured by negligence of third party); see also supra
note 31 and accompanying text (identifying court in Hitaffer as first court to grant wives loss of
consortium recovery due to defendant's negligent conduct toward spouse).
127. Erhardt, 53 Wash. 2d at 106, 330 P.2d at 1012. The court was unwilling to extend the
common law because the child could recover all claimed damages by an action in the parent's
name. Id.
128. 24 Wash. App. 92, 600 P.2d 602 (1979). In the case, three minor children sought
recovery for loss of parental consortium with their mother. Roth v. Bell, 24 Wash. App. 92,
93, 600 P.2d 602, 603 (1979). The mother suffered a severe stroke after taking an oral contra-
ceptive manufactured by one of the defendants. Id.
129. See id, at 93, 600 P.2d at 604 (granting recovery to husband for loss of consortium,
but denying recovery to children for loss of parental consortium because they had no recog-
nized right to sue).
130. Id. at 104, 600 P.2d at 607 (stating legislature was proper entity to balance interest of
injured party against defendant's limited liability).
131. 103 Wash. 2d 131, 691 P.2d 190 (1984).
132. See Lundgren v. Whitney's, Inc., 94 Wash. 2d 91, 92, 614 P.2d 1272, 1273 (1980)
(allowing wife to recover for loss of consortium when husband is injured); Harbeson v. Parke-
Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 477, 656 P.2d 483, 492-93 (1983) (allowing parents to recover
for loss of consortium with child as part of wrongful birth action).
133. Ueland v. Reynolds Metals, Co., 103 Wash. 2d 131, 134-35, 691 P.2d 190, 192
(1984) (noting that "stage was set for the adoption of the child's cause of action"). The court
followed the reasoning of Dean Pound of Harvard Law School. In 1916 Dean Pound wrote:
As against the world at large a child has an interest.., in the society and affection of
the parent, at least while he remains in the household. But the law has done little to
secure these interests. At common law there are no legal rights which protect them
.... It will have been observed that legal securing of the interests of children falls
far short of what general considerations would appear to demand.
Id. (citing Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MIcH. L. REV. 177, 185-86
(1916)); see also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ToRTs § 125, at 896 (4th ed. 1971)
(criticizing void in law that has denied child compensation for loss of parent's love and gui-
dance as result of negligent injury to parent). Dean Prosser stated that "[t]he interest of the
child in proper parental care.., has run into a stone wall ...." Id. Prosser argued that the
child does suffer a serious and genuine injury, but unfortunately the child has received more
sympathy from legal commentators than fromjudges. Id.
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In Ueland, the court found nonconformity in this area of law
troubling. For instance, a child is permitted to recover for loss of
consortium upon the death of a parent due to another's negli-
gence.134 Conversely, if the parent managed to survive, albeit in a
vegetative state, prior case law denied the child recovery.15 5 Addi-
tionally, the court saw the incongruity of allowing a husband or wife
to recover for loss of consortium, but not children.' 3 6 The court
viewed this. practice as a mistaken assumption that adults have a
greater tendency to suffer emotional harm than children.13 7 While
the court acknowledged that many jurisdictions have denied this
cause of action, 38 it noted that the "emerging trend" is to recog-
nize the child's right to recover for loss of parental consortium.' 39
The court found that cases adopting the child's cause of action were
more logically persuasive.' 40
V. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SHOULD RE-EXAMINE
Loss OF CONSORTIUM
Despite Ueland's recognition of the emerging trend allowing chil-
dren to recover for loss of consortium, a majority of courts still do
not recognize this cause of action.' 4 1 Before the District of Colum-
bia courts jettison long-standing precedent and adopt a minority
holding, they should closely evaluate the legal and social arguments
134. Ueland, 103 Wash. 2d at 134, 691 P.2d at 192.
135. Id.
136. Id.; see Comment, The Child's Right to Sue, supra note 17, at 742 (arguing children have
greater need for compensation for loss of emotional benefits from family than either parents
or spouses).
137. Ueland, 103 Wash. 2d at 134, 691 P.2d at 192.
138. Id. at 135, 691 P.2d at 193; see Annotation, The Child's Right of Action for Loss of Support,
Training, Parental Attention, or the Like, Against a Third Person Negligently Injuring Parent, 11 A.L.R.
4th 549, 552 (1982) (noting that courts have traditionally denied such cause of action).
139. Ueland, 103 Wash. 2d at 135, 691 P.2d at 193. At the time of the Ueland decision,
four courts had recognized the child's cause of action for loss of parental consortium. See
Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259, 270 (Iowa 1981) (maintaining that child has independent
cause of action for loss of society and companionship of parent tortiously injured by third
party); Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 516, 413 N.E.2d 690, 696
(1980) (asserting that children have viable claim for loss of parental society if they are minors
and dependent on injured parent); Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 13, 303 N.W.2d 424, 427
(1981) (recognizing child's right to recover for loss of parental consortium); Theama v. City
of Kenosha, 117 Wis. 2d 508, 527-28, 344 N.W.2d 513, 522 (1984) (holding that child may
bring cause of action for loss of parent's society and companionship resulting from another's
negligence).
140. Ueland, 103 Wash. 2d at 135, 691 P.2d at 193.
141. See Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 444, 563 P.2d 858, 860-61, 138
Cal. Rptr. 302, 304-05 (1977) (en banc) (noting significant differences between marital rela-
tionship and parent-child relationship and concluding that child does not have cause of action
for loss of consortium); Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 293 Or. 543, 557,
652 P.2d 318, 332 (1982) (denying child recovery for loss of parental consortium where
mother suffered brain damage that would require her to have life long custodial care).
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presented on both sides of this issue. The traditional arguments
brought forth to combat the expansion of loss of consortium are
legislative deference, 142 the intangible nature of the loss,148 the po-
tential for double recovery, 144 the concern of increased litigation, 145
and the fear of escalating insurance rates.' 46 The analyses adopted
by Ferriter, Berger, Ueland, and their progeny show that these legal
arguments do not warrant the continued denial of children's rights
to recover for loss of parental consortium. Moreover, public policy
considerations demonstrate that courts should recognize a cause of
action for loss of parental consortium. 47
A. Dismantling the Traditional Arguments Against
Expanding Loss of Consortium
1. Legislative deference
Many courts, while recognizing the equity of providing children
with the right to recover for loss of parental consortium, 48 have
reasoned that the legislature, and not the judiciary, should make sig-
nificant changes in the common law. 149 These courts defer to the
142. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (noting that legislature is appropriate me-
dium for change of this nature).
143. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (arguing that action for loss of parental con-
sortium need not be recognized because it is too intangible).
144. See Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1982) (stating that double re-
covery to child presents very real threat because juries may already factor in child's emotional
loss through award to parent). But see Hay v. Medical Center Hosp., 145 Vt. 533, 541-42, 496
A.2d 939, 944 (1985) (noting that careful jury instructions can avoid problem of double re-
covery); Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 17, 303 N.W.2d 424, 427 (1981) (asserting that better
alternative is to have child's claims argued openly in court and evaluated separately).
145. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing fear of increased litigation).
146. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (observing that numerous claims may evolve
from one tortious incident); see also Salin, 322 N.W.2d at 741 (noting that settling or litigating
claims for loss of consortium would be sizable expense, plus substantial social cost would
result from use of valuable judicial resources).
147. See generally Comment, The Child's Right to Sue, supra note 17, at 740 (noting that child
who is deprived of parent's love, care, companionship, and guidance experiences tremendous
loss); Love, Tortious Interference with the Parent-Child Relationship, supra note 17, at 597 (maintain-
ing that it is possible to view both actions for spousal consortium and actions for parental
consortium as compensating for loss of familial society and companionship); Petrilli, A Child's
Right to Collect, supra note 17, at 320 (concluding that children have legal interest in their
relationship with family members and, therefore, have remedial right to sue for enforcement
of such interest).
148. See Hoffman v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, 169, 368 P.2d 57, 59 (1962) (acknowledging
that child of injured parent is deprived of something valuable and precious, but nevertheless
rejecting child's claim because of its "far-reaching results").
149. Accord Zorzos v. Rosen, 467 So. 2d 305, 307 (Fla. 1985) (maintaining that it is wiser
to allow legislature to confer right as legislative branch has greater ability to study and evalu-
ate cause); Huter v. Ekman, 137 Ill. App. 3d 733, 735, 484 N.E.2d 1224, 1225-26 (1985)
(reasoning that legislature is in better position to weigh costs and benefits of proposed ac-
tion); Steiner v. Bell Tel. Co., 358 Pa. Super. 505, 513, 517 A.2d 1348, 1356 (1986) (stating
that due to legislature's greater ability to weigh benefits and costs of creating new legal reme-
dies, it, and not courts, is appropriate entity to create cause of action for child's loss of consor-
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legislature and deny the child's right to recover for loss of parental
consortium. 50 In Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., however, the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit did not wait for legislative action to extend loss of
consortium recovery to the wife of the injured spouse.151 In 1958,
however, the same court, in Pleasant v. Washington Sand & Gravel Co.,
refused to similarly recognize a child's cause of action for loss of
parental consortium, relying on the excuse that a change of this na-
ture should be left to the legislature.'5 2
Several courts presented with the loss of parental consortium is-
sue have adhered to the legislative deference argument.' 5 3 The
courts adopting this rationale fail to recognize that the action for
loss of consortium was originally a judicial, not legislative, creation
and, therefore, can be judicially expanded.15 4 Traditionally, courts
have discovered rights and remedies in response to perceived needs
of individuals and society's changing aspirations. 5 5  As society
evolves, courts should recognize new or evolving rights and reme-
dies.' 56 The proper approach for the expansion of loss of consor-
tium is for courts to take an active role in evaluating the common
tium); see Duhan v. Milanowski, 75 Misc. 2d 1078, 1084, 348 N.Y.S.2d 696, 702 (Sup. Ct.
1973) (stating thatjudicial system is completely inadequate to solve such complex issue). But
see Reben v. Ely, 146 Ariz. 309, 310, 705 P.2d 1360, 1361 (Ct. App. 1985) (noting that legisla-
tive inaction in areas of loss of consortium is not expression of legislative intent).
Recently, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that a child may not recover for the loss of
parental consortium when a parent is injured by a negligent third party. Gaver v. Harrant,
316 Md. 17, 32, 557 A.2d 210, 218 (1989). The District of Columbia often looks to the law of
Maryland for guidance. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 49-301 (1981) (stating that common law and all
British statutes in force in Maryland remain in force in District of Columbia except where
inconsistent with or repealed by subsequent legislation). The District of Columbia, however,
is not required to follow the laws of Maryland blindly, particularly in the area of common law.
White v. Parnell, 397 F.2d 709, 710 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
150. See supra note 149 (identifying courts which defer to legislature).
151. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (observing D.C. Circuit's willingness to
break ground in area of loss of spousal consortium to wife).
152. Pleasant v. Washington Sand & Gravel Co., 262 F.2d 471, 472-73 (D.C. Cir. 1958);
see supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text (observing D.C. Circuit's reluctance to expand
loss of consortium recovery to children).
153. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (noting legislative deference as reason for
denying child's cause of action).
154. See Comment, The Child's Right to Sue, supra note 17, at 729; see also Lundgren v.
Whitney's, Inc., 94 Wash. 2d 91, 92-95, 614 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1980) (stating that most courts
have rejected argument that abrogation of common law loss of consortium rule should be left
to legislature and that it is court's duty to reassess common law); Ueland v. Reynolds Metals
Co., 103 Wash. 2d 131, 140, 691 P.2d 190, 193 (1984) (granting children right of action for
loss of parental consortium and refusing to defer to legislature because justice requires refor-
mation of common law to answer evolving standards).
155. See Reben v. Ely, 146 Ariz. 309, 314, 705 P.2d 1360, 1365 (Ct. App. 1985) (stating
"common law is fluid and responsive"); Hay v. Medical Center Hosp., 145 Vt. 533, 543, 496
A.2d 939, 945 (1985) (asserting that "[t]he main characteristic of the common law is its
dynamism").
156. Justice Cardozo's famous directive illustrates the appropriate role of the court:
The court best serves the law which recognizes that the rule of law which grew up in
a remote generation may... be found to serve another generation badly, and which
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law, rather than abdicating their responsibility by deferring to the
legislature.157
2. Intangible nature of the loss
Another argument against the expansion of the common law is
that loss of parental consortium is too intangible.' 58 Some courts
fear that damages would be too speculative and not offer the appro-
priate remedy to the child.1 59 Loss of consortium damages will al-
ways be somewhat "uncertain" because these damages seek
compensation for an intangible loss-yet, District of Columbia
courts authorize the recovery of damages for intangible losses in
many cases.1 60 In Hitaffer, for example, the court denounced this
same argument in 1950 when it provided wives with recovery for a
similar intangible loss. 16 1
Although a monetary award cannot replace the loss of a parent, it
is the only remedy that our legal system can offer. 162 Compensation
discards the old rule when it finds that another rule of law represents what should be
according to the established and settled judgment of society....
B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PRocEss 151-52 (1921).
157. See Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 17, 303 N.W.2d 424, 427 (1981) (asserting court
should remove obstacle that prevents children from recovering for loss of parental
consortium).
158. See Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1982) (asserting that intangible
nature of child's loss presents difficulties in assessing damages and provides another reason
against recognizing cause of action). But see Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 14, 303 N.W.2d
424, 427 (1981) (arguing that damages for child's cause of action are no more remote than
those for loss of spousal consortium).
159. See Salin, 322 N.W.2d at 740; see also Note, Purging the Law, supra note 19, at 547
(noting intangible nature of loss as one of primary reasons courts have refused to recognize
right of child to maintain loss of parental consortium cause of action).
160. See, e.g., Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 105 F.2d 62, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1939)
(asserting that recovery for emotional distress would be granted in action for intentional in-
fliction where act both exceeds norms of decency and is without reason or explanation); Perry
v. Capital Traction Co., 32 F.2d 938, 939 (D.C. Cir.) (maintaining that mental pain and suffer-
ing may be considered as component of damages where person has suffered physical injury),
cert. denied, 280 U.S. 577 (1929); Williams v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062, 1064 (D.C. 1990) (en banc)
(allowing recovery for emotional distress to witness of accident providing witness was imme-
diate family member and in zone of physical danger); Capitol Hill Hosp. v.Jones, No. 86-629,
slip op. at 3-8 (D.C. Oct. 13, 1987) (affirming $100,000 judgment for pain and suffering ex-
perienced by decedent during forty-five minute period between termination of oxygen sup-
plement and cardiac arrest); Doe v. Binker, 492 A.2d 857, 861 (D.C. 1985) (maintaining that
existence of pain and suffering can be inferred from circumstances surrounding decedent's
death).
161. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 815 (D.C. Cir.) (noting that there is no judi-
cial precedent for rule that action for loss of sentimental elements of consortium cannot be
allowed absent showing of loss of material services), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950), overruled
on other grounds, Smith & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220 (1956).
162. Note, Washington Expands a Child's Cause of Action for Loss of Parental Consortium: Ueland
v. Reynolds Metals Co., 103 Wash. 2d 131, 691 P.2d 190 (1984), 20 GONZ. L. REv. 601, 605
(1984-85) [hereinafter Note, Washington Expands a Child's Cause of Action] (stating that damages
do not properly compensate for loss suffered); see Theama v. City of Kenosha, 117 Wis. 2d
508, 523, 344 N.W.2d 513, 526 (1984) (recognizing that compensation in form of monetary
award is shortcoming of society, yet preferring to allow such award rather than completely
129
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seems even more appropriate in the parent-child relationship than
in the spousal relationship. In fact, a child's reliance on a parent
may be greater than the reliance between a husband and wife.163
Adults have the ability to create new relationships to replace the
emotional support they have lost. 64 Children, on the other hand,
would rarely take the initiative to form new relationships to mitigate
their loss. 165 Children of a single parent who have grown accus-
tomed to depending on that one person are even less likely to fill
their emotional void.166 It is in society's best interest to facilitate a
child's emotional development. 167 While monetary awards are no
replacement for parental love and affection, they can offset some of
the difficulties.168
3. Double recovery
The fear of double recovery has caused other courts to shy away
from the recognition of the child's right to recover for loss of paren-
tal consortium. 169 The argument that permitting children to re-
cover results in double recovery assumes, often incorrectly, that a
jury considers the plight of children when awarding damages to the
injured parent.1 70 Accordingly, any further compensation to the
children would result in double recovery.' 7 1
Washington Hospital shows that this assumption is mistaken. In the
Washington v. Washington Hospital Center trial, the jury never heard
deny recovery to child who has suffered loss of parent's society and companionship); Com-
ment, The Child's Right to Sue, supra note 17, at 734 (arguing that monetary award can alleviate
loss by allowing for services such as live-in help which may permit child to receive some gui-
dance and companionship).
163. See Comment, The Child's Right to Sue, supra note 17, at 742 (arguing that children are
in greater need of compensation because they are in their formative years and, therefore,
require more emotional nurturance to develop appropriately).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See Glicklich v. Spievack, 16 Mass. App. 488, 496, 452 N.E.2d 287, 292 (1983) (stat-
ing that minor son living with single parent could recover for loss of parental consortium,
even though he was not economically dependent on parent, because it was sufficient that
mother had played significant role in daily life).
167. See infra note 208 and accompanying text (emphasizing how well-being of children
affects society).
168. See infra notes 201-03 (suggesting some ways monetary award may mitigate traumatic
impact that loss of parent has on child).
169. See Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1982) (arguing that double
recovery is possible since juries may already compensate child for loss of economic support
through award to parent, or juries may indirectly factor in child's emotional loss through
award to parent). But see Hay v. Medical Center Hosp., 145 Vt. 533, 541-42, 496 A.2d 939,
944 (1985) (stating that careful jury instructions can avoid problem of double recovery).
170. See generally Note, Washington Expands a Child's Cause of Action, supra note 162, at 605
(noting that acceptance of double recovery argument assumes that juries do not follow in-
structions of trial court).
171. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (identifying potential threat of double
recovery).
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Mrs. Thompson's children testify and never really heard the full ex-
tent of the hardships wrought as a result of the injuries to their
mother.17 2 Thus, any indirect compensation that the children re-
ceived would be awarded in a purely speculative manner.
A simple resolution to the potential problem of double recovery
would be for judges to instruct the jury that the children's damages
are distinct from the parent's injury.173 Juries could make two sepa-
rate damage awards. The children would be compensated for the
loss of companionship, support, and guidance with the injured par-
ent. The injured parent, on the other hand, would receive an award
as compensation for the injuries personal to herself or himself.
One court noted that recognition of the child's cause of action
would permit greater equity.' 7 4 Independent claims for children
would prevent juries from blindly calculating the loss suffered by
the child as a part of the damages awarded to the parent. 7 5 When
juries incorporate damages for the child into the parent's recovery,
the protection of that child's rights are left to chance. 76 The reality
is that the child is harmed and should not be forced to depend on
the cause of action of another for compensation.17 7
4. Increased litigation
Some courts have expressed a concern that recognition of the
right to recover for loss of parental consortium may significantly in-
172. Interview with David T. Smorodin, Esq., Counsel for plaintiffs, in Washington, D.C.
(Apr. 10, 1991).
173. Hay, 145 Vt. at 541-42, 496 A.2d at 944. Samplejury instructions for loss of paren-
tal consortium could parallel those used in spousal consortium cases. See Shockley v. Prier, 66
Wis. 2d 394, 403 n.5, 225 N.W.2d 495, 500 n.5 (1975) (identifyingjury instructions for loss of
consortium when husband is injured). The instructions could read as follows:
To answer the question pertaining to loss of parental consortium with the parent,
you should name such sum as you feel will fairly and reasonably compensate the
children for such loss as they have sustained by being deprived of the parent's aid,
assistance, comfort, society, and companionship during such period as the parent
was unable to render such services because of the injuries. In considering the
amount to be awarded, you will bear in mind the evidence as to the relationship
which existed between the parent and the child before the injury.
You will not include in your finding any sum which you are required to determine
in any other question, representing loss of earning capacity sustained by the parent
by reason of his injuries. To do so would allow double damages for such loss of
earning capacity, which you must not do.
174. Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 4, 303 N.W.2d 424, 427 (1981) (explaining that dan-
ger of double recovery when making awards to parents is good reason for recognizing in-
dependent cause of action).
175. See id. (maintaining that child's loss could be openly argued in court).
176. See id. (noting that parent may or may not spend award on child).
177. Comment, The Child's Claim, supra note 17, at 248 (addressing concern that because
parent cannot recover for child's loss, child is unprotected) (quoting Maddever, Right of Child
to Recover Damages for Enticement of His Mother, 20 CORNELL L.Q. 255, 257 (1935)).
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crease litigation.178 Courts have feared that the number of claims
made would equal the number of children of the injured parent.179
Rather than ignore the legal rights of children, courts can minimize
this concern by requiring that the claims of all children be joined
with the injured parent's lawsuit.' 80 Once it is determined that a
wrong has been committed, it would be an act of injustice to deny
recovery of one individual simply because additional claims may be
brought.' 8 ' The theory is that all who are wronged as a result of the
defendant's conduct should receive compensation from the defend-
ant.18 2 The concern of increased litigation should not be a factor
for denying the child's cause of action where mandatory joinder of
claims can solve the potential problem. 8 3
5. Increased insurance rates
A final argument courts often present against recognizing a
child's right to recover for loss of parental consortium is that society
will bear the cost of this new cause of action through increased in-
surance rates. 8 4 It is questionable whether judicial recognition of a
child's right to loss of consortium recovery would substantially in-
crease insurance rates because many insurance companies may be
178. See Pleasant v. Washington Sand & Gravel Co., 262 F.2d 471, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1958)
(naming potential for increased litigation as consideration weighing against change in com-
mon law); Hoffman v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, 169, 368 P.2d 57, 60 (1962) (stating that pos-
sibilities of multiplicity of actions and double recovery are sufficient to warrant denial of cause
of action for children's loss of consortium); Gaver v. Harrant, 316 Md. 17, 25, 557 A.2d 210,
215 (1989) (noting that child's cause of action for loss of parental consortium could lead to
similar actions for siblings, grandparents, and parent-substitutes).
179. See Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441,447,563 P.2d 858, 863, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 302, 307 (1977) (maintaining that all nine children of injured parent would have in-
dependent right of action for loss of consortium).
180. See Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co., 103 Wash. 2d 131, 140, 691 P.2d 190, 194 (1984)
(holding that children's claims for loss of parental consortium must be joined with injured
parent's claim whenever possible); see also Love, Tortious Interference with the Parent-Child Rela-
tionship, supra note 17, at 604 (identifying solution to problem of increased litigation by requir-
ing children in single family to sue as class); FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a) (noting that all persons may
join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief arising out of same transaction
or occurrence).
181. See Comment, The Child's Claim, supra note 17, at 248-49 (arguing that all who are
injured should be allowed to recover against wrongdoer) (quoting Maddever, Right of Child to
Recover Damages for Enticement of His Mother, 20 CORNELL L.Q. 255, 256 (1935)); see also Williams
v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062, 1067 (D.C. 1990) (concerning mother's recovery for mental dis-
tress). The court in Williams stated that "fear of opening the gates to a flood of litigation
[should not] be determinative of whether the interest in question should be legally pro-
tected." Id.
182. See Comment, The Child's Claim, supra note 17, at 248 (concluding child should not
have to depend upon non-injured parent's cause of action for compensation for it is uncertain
whether child would ever recover) (quoting Maddever, Right of Child to Recover Damages for
Enticement of His Mother, 20 CORNELL L.Q. 255, 256 (1935)).
183. See supra note 180 and accompanying text (discussing joinder of claims).
184. See Note, Washington Expands a Child's Cause of Action, supra note 162, at 605 (maintain-
ing argument of increased insurance rates as reason for denying child's cause of action).
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currently paying children's claims in settlements to avoid unfavora-
blejudgments.185 Insurance costs may increase, but this should not
bar recognition of the child's cause of action.18 6 Until such cause of
action is implemented, the increase in insurance rates cannot be de-
termined with certainty.18 7
Furthermore, the argument is weakened because courts that have
rejected loss of parental consortium as a cause of action have dis-
missed the argument of an increased societal insurance burden.188
These courts note that recognition-of the child's right to loss of pa-
rental consortium recovery cannot be "weighed" against the con-
cern of increasing insurance rates.18 9 The cost of insurance must
not be a factor in determining a party's legal liability. Rather, the
cost of such insurance should vary with the magnitude of a person's
potential liability under the law.190
B. Arguments in Favor of Expanding Loss of Consortium
1. Policy considerations
The decision to recognize a child's cause of action for loss of pa-
rental consortium has significant public policy considerations. 91
The decision to allow a child the opportunity to recover for lost pa-
rental consortium signifies the importance society attaches to pro-
tecting the interest of children.192 The primary reasons for allowing
the child to recover are the recognition of children as legal per-
sons, 193 the acknowledgment that the child has suffered true
185. See Harrison, Children Collect Consortium with Injured Parents, 11 LAw. ALERT No. 6, 1, 8
(Mar. 18, 1991) (acknowledging that it is in defendant's best interest to settle cases in order to
avoid larger liability in future cases).
186. Love, Tortious Interference with the Parent-Child Relationship, supra note 17, at 604 (dis-
cussing possibility of increased premiums and ceiling on amount of damages recoverable as
solution if costs of recognizing child's cause of action for loss of parental consortium becomes
prohibitive).
187. Id. (stating it is impossible to predict precise impact child's right to recover for loss
of parental consortium will have on insurance premiums).
188. See Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 293 Or. 543, 552, 652 P.2d 318,
323 (1982) (refusing to recognize child's cause of action for loss of parental consortium, while
discounting argument of increased insurance costs); see also Green v. A.B. Hagglund & Soner,
634 F. Supp. 790, 796 (D. Idaho 1986) (adopting analysis and conclusion of Norwest in refus-
ing to recognize child's loss of consortium cause of action).
189. See Norwest, 293 Or. at 522, 652 P.2d at 323 (determining courts cannot weigh psy-
chological or social elements involved in determining compensation for child against insur-
ance rates).
190. Id. (emphasizing that person's liability under common law "remains the same
whether or not he has liability insurance").
191. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (listing policy considerations).
192. See Comment, The Child's Right to Sue, supra note 17, at 740 (noting that decision to
impose liability upon defendant signifies that social importance of protecting child's interest
exceeds importance of freeing defendant from liability).
193. See Theama v. City of Kenosha, 117 Wis. 2d 508, 516-17, 344 N.W.2d 513, 517-18
(1984) (noting child's evolving status into person deserving of constitutional rights and pro-
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loss, 19 4 and the importance of the family relationship.1 95
First, the courts have begun to recognize the child as a legal per-
son. Accordingly, children should receive the same legal protec-
tions and opportunities currently provided to adults.1 96 If an adult
can receive compensation for loss of consortium with an injured
spouse, children should likewise be compensated for loss of consor-
tium with an injured parent.' 97
Second, common sense requires the recognition that children suf-
fer a genuine loss when they are deprived of a parent's companion-
ship and affection.' 98 Studies have shown that these losses have a
negative impact on the child's development and, consequently, have
long range effects on the child's welfare and personality.' 99 It is
well known that life experiences have different effects on an individ-
ual's personality. 200 If children can encounter enough rewarding
experiences, their losses may be softened.20 1 An award of damages
to the child enables the child to receive services and activities that
tections as factor for granting child's cause of action for loss of consortium). For examples of
protections that children receive, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 243 (1972) (Douglas,
J., dissenting) (stating "children are 'persons' within the meaning of the Bill of Rights");
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944) (maintaining that it is in society's interest to
protect children from abuse and provide opportunity for them to grow into well-developed
citizens), reh'g denied, 321 U.S. 804 (1944).
194. See Comment, The Child's Right to Sue, supra note 17, at 740 (recognizing that children
suffer serious loss when they are denied injured parent's love, care, companionship, and
guidance).
195. See id. at 741 (acknowledging that family relationship is relation on which "society
must depend for endurance, permanence, and well-being") (quoting Russick v. Hicks, 85 F.
Supp. 281, 284 (W.D. Mich. 1949)); see also Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 517-18, 344 N.W.2d at 518(observing importance of family unit in society).
196. Weir v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259, 269 (Iowa 1981) (discussing trend to recognize
child's cause of action for loss of parental consortium and concluding that since children suf-
fer most, money damages should be awarded separately to ensure it benefits child).
197. See id. (stating that arguments presented to deny recognition of child's claim are no
more significant than those in spouse's claim).
198. See Theama v. City of Kenosha, 117 Wis. 2d 508, 514-16, 344 N.W.2d 513, 516
(1984) (emphasizing that child's loss deprives child of necessary ingredients for healthy
development).
199. See Psychological Problems and Parental Loss, 113 Sc. NEWS 21 (1978) (reporting that
parental loss is "common thread" among people who receive psychotherapy); Roy, Spedficity
of Risk Factors for Depression, 138 AM. J. PsYCHIATRY 959, 961 (1981) (concluding that early
parental loss is contributing factor in adult depression);Johnson & Rosenblatt, Grief Following
Childhood Loss of a Parent, 35 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 419, 424 (1981) (stating that childhood
loss of parent will lead to inescapable outbursts of grief years later); Dietrich, Psychological
Health of Young Adults Who Experienced Early Parental Death: MMPI Trends, 40 J. CLINICAL PSY-
CHOLOGY 901, 901 (1984) (noting that parental loss during childhood and adolescence
presents potential psychological effects of substantial clinical, social, and research
importance).
200. R. ROHNER, THEY LOVE ME, THEY LOVE ME NOT-A WORLDWIDE STUDY OF THE EF-
FECTS OF PARENTAL ACCEPTANCE AND REJECTION 104 (1975).
201. See id. at 105 (discussing how some rejected children benefit from warm, non-hostile
relations with their peers).
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they would otherwise be unable to obtain.20 2 In the long run, soci-
ety benefits from a healthy and emotionally stable citizenry.20 3
Third, because the family is an integral part of our society and the
child plays a significant role in the family relationship, the child's
interest should require legal protection. 20 4 The judicial system's
failure to recognize the child's right to recover for loss of parental
consortium devalues the importance of a parent. 20 5 The reality is
that each family member plays a significant role in creating the fam-
ily unit.206 Because an injury to one family member affects all
others, the loss of spousal consortium can be no more weighty than
the loss of parental consortium.207
Considering these three elements-recognition of children as
legal persons, acknowledgement that the child has suffered a true
loss, and the importance of the family relationship-it would be un-
just to refuse to grant the child's cause of action for loss of parental
consortium. The child's loss of a parent's companionship and affec-
tion can significantly influence a child's welfare and personality for
his or her entire life. Because the nature and disposition of every
individual impacts society, it is extremely important to both children
and society that the legal system protect the nurturance and support
children receive from their parents. 20 8
2. One unexplored avenue: changing structure of the family
One important consideration that most courts fail to focus on
202. See generally Petrilli, A Child's Right to Collect, supra note 17, at 346 (stating compensa-
tion can provide children with babysitters, psychiatrists, or other counselors to promote nor-
mal development).
203. See Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 15, 303 N.W.2d 424, 426 (1981) (noting that com-
pensation can help child function without emotional handicap).
204. See supra note 195 and accompanying text (acknowledging important role families
play in society); see also Williams v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062, 1064 (D.C. 1990) (concerning
granting of recovery to family members for emotional distress). The Williams court held that
"immediate family members" could recover for emotional distress if they were within the
physical zone of danger and feared for their own safety. Id.
205. See Comment, The Child's Right to Sue, supra note 17, at 741 (emphasizing that denial
of child's right to recover for loss of parental consortium undermines importance of parent to
child). But see Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co., 103 Wash. 2d 131, 142, 691 P.2d 190, 196
(1984) (Dore, J., dissenting) (pointing out that by awarding parental consortium damages,
child will receive message that "the special relationship he had with his parent was not special
after all because it could be replaced by money"). Judge Dore concluded his dissent with the
following observation: "Unfortunately, some pains in life must be endured and overcome by
the individual himself. Perhaps it is better this way; sometimes a child should grieve and learn
that a parent's love is irreplaceable." Id. at 143, 691 P.2d at 197.
206. See generally Comment, The Child's Right to Sue, supra note 17, at 741-42 (discussing the
roles and interests of spouses, parent, and child as well as comparable worth of those roles to
family unit).
207. Id. (concluding that children have equal or more need for compensation of consor-
tium loss than do parents or spouses).
208. Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 403, 37 N.W.2d 543, 545 (1949).
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when reviewing the parental consortium issue is the changing struc-
ture of the family.209 The American family today is quite different
from families at the time the judiciary first created the concept of
consortium. 210 Today it has become more and more common to
find families composed of only one adult, usually a woman and mi-
nor children.2 11 For instance, in the District of Columbia 19.3% of
the households are headed by women with minor children.212
When children have only one parent in the home and that parent is
injured, their loss can only be intensified. 213 Nevertheless, the law
currently deprives these children of any right to recover for their
loss when a parent, possibly their only one, is injured.214
It is essential that the law maintain sufficient flexibility to change
with society.215 The importance of protecting children's interests
and the emergence of a new family structure are two factors that
were absent when the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit denied the child's cause of action for loss
of parental consortium in 1958.216 These changed circumstances
should mandate the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to ex-
pand its law regarding loss of consortium.
209. See Petrilli, A Child's Right to Collect, supra note 17, at 344 (discussing failure of courts
to consider one-adult families and changing family structures when considering whether to
adopt child's cause of action for loss of parental consortium).
210. See Petrilli, A Child's Right to Collect, supra note 17, at 344 n.70 (citing that 25% of
children in United States may experience mental development troubles because one out of
four children live in households without one or both parents); see also UNrrED STATES DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF UNITED STATES 53 (104th ed.
1983) (finding that one out of four children live in households that lack one or both parents);
T. NAZARIO, IN DEFENSE OF CHILDREN: UNDERSTANDING THE RIGHTS, NEEDS AND INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 180 (1988) (noting that families have changed dramatically in recent years). The
author cites the following changes: the number of couples living together without the "bene-
fit" of marriage has nearly tripled, the divorce rate has increased 65%b over the past ten years,
single parenting has increased, and the percentage of families where both husband and wife
work has increased by nearly 20%o. Id. at 181. Despite these changes, the family must con-
tinue to fulfill the needs of children. Id. at 180. Fulfilling the needs of children entails spend-
ing time with children each day, sharing personal beliefs and feelings, and encouraging the
development of outside friendships and experiences. Id.
211. Petrilli, A Child's Right to Collect, supra note 17, at 344.
212. M. BARRY, VITAL STATISTICS SUMMARY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (1985).
213. See Beikmann v. International Playtex, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 255, 258 (D. Colo. 1987)
(surmising children are in greater need of law's protection than spouses because children of
single parent families often do not have someone to guide, comfort, or support them
throughout life after they lose parent).
214. See Pleasant v. Washington Sand & Gravel Co., 262 F.2d 471, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1958)
(denying loss of parental consortium recovery to child of injured parent).
215. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 51, at 27-28 (citing Holmes, The Path ofthe Law, 10
HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897)) (stating that "[i]t is ... revolting if the grounds upon which
... [a rule] was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past.").
216. See supra note 210 and accompanying text (discussing recent societal changes).
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals should recognize the
child's cause of action for loss of parental consortium. In doing so,
the court should establish parameters for recovery. In order to es-
tablish guidelines for recovery, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals must evaluate three areas: the severity of the injury re-
quired to implicate a suit for loss of parental consortium, the mea-
sure of damages, and the allocation of damages.
Admittedly, children are inconvenienced virtually every time their
parents are injured. The court, therefore, must determine the
threshold level at which the child's loss will be deemed sufficient to
warrant compensation. For instance, should a child receive com-
pensation if a parent breaks a leg and is temporarily unable to par-
ticipate in recreational activities? One can easily envision claims for
recovery being taken to the extreme.217
Most courts that allow a child to recover for loss of parental con-
sortium limit recovery to situations where the parent is severely in-
jured.218 The inquiry for determining whether a parent is severely
injured determines whether the child suffered a loss of society and
companionship and, consequently, is deprived of parental guidance,
love, and affection. 219 In Washington Hospital Center, these questions
are easily answered. Both Devin Michelle Thompson and her sister
Toyia Green clearly have been deprived of their mother's guidance,
love, and affection. 220 Their mother will remain, according to medi-
cal opinion, in a vegetative state for the remainder of her life.221 It
would be difficult to imagine a more compelling case for recogniz-
ing a child's loss of parental consortium. Unfortunately, the District
217. See generally Williams v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062, 1064 (D.C. 1990) (maintaining that
there must be some limit to liability).
It is still unthinkable that any one shall be liable to the end of time for all of the
results that follow in endless sequence from his single act. Causation cannot be the
answer;, in a very real sense the consequences of an act go forward to eternity, and
back to the beginning of the world.
Id. (quoting Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REv. 1, 24 (1953)).
218. See generally Note, Washington Expands a Child's Cause of Action, supra note 162, at 611
(asserting that limiting recovery to those situations where parent is severely injured will de-
crease chance of unwarranted recovery and unlimited liability). But see Berger v. Weber, 411
Mich. 1, 17, 303 N.W.2d 424, 427 (1981) (refusing to limit child's cause of action to instances
where parents are "severely" injured).
219. See Note, Washington Expands a Child's Cause of Action, supra note 162, at 611 (noting
that where parent is severely injured, child will be deprived of parental guidance, support, and
affection).
220. See Washington v. Washington Hosp. Center, 579 A.2d 177, 180 (D.C. 1990) (noting
that mother is "'essentially awake but unaware' of her surroundings").
221. Id.
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of Columbia Court of Appeals did not seize this opportunity to rec-
ognize the child's cause of action.
In cases such as Washington Hospital Center, the appropriate mea-
sure of damages is difficult to assess due to the intangible nature of
the loss. 222 In making such a determination, the jury must be in-
structed to look at the totality of the circumstances. Such circum-
stances include, but are not limited to, the ages of the children, the
level of interaction between the parent and the child, and the per-
sonalities of both the parent and the child. 223 If an injured parent
has several children, the fact finder should determine the appropri-
ate measure of damages for each child by evaluating each child's
individual loss. 224
In setting the limits of loss of consortium claims, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals may wish to refer to the Wrongful
Death Act as a guide. 225 Recovery under the Wrongful Death Act
compensates the decedent's spouse for both the monetary loss of
income and the value of services lost to the family as a result of the
decedent's death.226 The court should not, however, feel compelled
to limit recovery to the standards set out in the Act for two reasons.
First, a child whose parent has died suffers a loss equal to the loss of
a child whose parent is severely injured, yet the child with the in-
jured parent is reminded of his or her loss daily, thus, preventing
the child's grief from fading with time.227 Second, the Wrongful
Death Act and the remedy of loss of consortium were created in two
different spheres, the legislature and common law respectively.228
Given these differences, incongruous treatment of the two would be
appropriate. 229
222. See generally Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CALIF. L. REV.
772 (1985) (discussing difficulties of assessing and compensating intangible injuries due to
non-transferable and non-quantifiable nature of losses associated with tort actions).
223. See Love, Tortious Interference with the Parent-Child Relationship, supra note 17, at 623
(outlining factors for measurement of damages).
224. Id. at 625 (discussing alternatives for allocating damages when more than one survi-
vor brings wrongful death action).
225. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (enumerating elements of Wrongful Death
Act and identifying anomaly in law of permitting recovery in wrongful death situations, yet
denying recovery when parent is negligently injured).
226. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2701 (1989).
227. See Love, Tortious Interference with the Parent-Child Relationship, supra note 17, at 610-12
(maintaining death/injury classification of wrongful death statutes should be subjected to in-
termediate standard of review, and as such, are fatally underinclusive, because parents and
children of severely injured person sustain genuine loss of society and companionship, recov-
ery for which is one objective of wrongful death legislation).
228. See Cogger v. Trudell, 35 Wis. 2d 350, 353, 151 N.W.2d 146, 147 (1967) (noting that
cause ofaction for wrongful death is purely statutory as no such right existed at common law).
229. See Theama v. City of Kenosha, 117 Wis. 2d 508, 519, 344 N.W.2d 513, 518 (1984)(acknowledging that children of injured parent would not have cause of action under Wrong-
ful Death Act, but noting that cause of action for wrongful death evolved from legislature and
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Further, the allocation of damages should accrue to the child im-
mediately.230 The purpose behind immediate compensation is that
children need help alleviating the pain they suffer while growing
up. 23 1 The child's recovery may be partially spent during childhood
in order to provide support for the child.23 2 In this way, the child's
rights will truly be effectuated.
It makes sense for society to require the negligent party to pro-
vide assistance to the children rather than for children to bear these
costs themselves. Although a monetary award cannot replace the
love, care, and guidance offered by a parent, it can assist in filling
the void a child experiences when deprived of parental consor-
tium. 23 3 Society must protect the interests of children, as children
cannot protect themselves.
CONCLUSION
The current status of the law in the District of Columbia does not
permit a child to recover loss of consortium damages when a parent
is injured by a person's negligent conduct.23 4 Children should have
a recognized cause of action for the loss of society, companionship,
care, affection, protection, and support of their injured parent.23 5
In cases such as Washington Hospital Center, justice compels the allow-
ance of such a cause of action.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit recognized the need to expand the common law in 1950
when it allowed wives to recover for loss of spousal consortium.
236
At that time, the court altered the common law to adapt to the
that courts developed cause of action for loss of consortium and, thus, it is court's duty to
grant recovery to children for loss of parental consortium); see also Salin v. Kloempken, 322
N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn. 1982) (recognizing loss of consortium dilemma belongs before
courts, not legislature, for loss of consortium is creation of common law).
230. See Note, Washington Expands a Child's Cause of Action, supra note 162, at 611 (discussing
logistics of payment to child).
231. See supra notes 199-203 and accompanying text (stating that parental loss during
childhood can cause emotional and psychological problems, but compensation can help child
function without emotional handicap).
232. See supra note 202 and accompanying text (noting benefits children can obtain by
receiving compensation during childhood).
233. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text (discussing benefits that compensation
can provide).
234. See Pleasant v. Washington Sand & Gravel Co., 262 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (con-
cluding children have no right to maintain action for loss of parental consortium).
235. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing prior holdings that recognized
children's right to maintain cause of action to recover for loss of parental consortium).
236. See Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 819 (D.C. Cir.) (recognizing wife's loss of
consortium claim), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950), overruled on other grounds, Smith & Co. v.
Coles, 242 F.2d 220 (1956) (disagreeing with lower court's interpretation of Longshore and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act).
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changing conditions of society.23 7 Spousal consortium, however, fo-
cused less on the services aspect of the claim and more on the senti-
mental elements. 238
Today, the emerging trend is toward judicial recognition of pa-
rental consortium.23 9 Not only has the meaning of consortium
broadened since 1950, but the child's status in our society has
changed. 240 Children are now recognized fully as legal persons de-
serving of the same protection adults enjoy. 241
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit was the first court to recognize a wife's right to spousal con-
sortium.24 2 The arguments against expanding loss of consortium
recovery to children today are the same arguments the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit confronted
and discounted when it allowed wives to recover for loss of spousal
consortium. 243 The loss children suffer when a parent is negligently
injured can be no more intangible than the loss a wife suffers when
her spouse is negligently injured.244 By requiring specific jury in-
structions and joinder of the children's claims with that of the in-
jured parent, courts can avoid double recovery and increased
litigation.245
Children need and deserve to have a cause of action for loss of
parental consortium. Given that society and the law have begun to
recognize the changing status of children, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals should likewise adapt to these changes and recog-
nize the child's cause of action. By allowing children to recover for
loss of parental consortium, the District of Columbia can maintain
its status as a forerunner in recognizing consortium recovery.
237. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing expansion of common law).
238. Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 814.
239. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (listing cases that support trend recognizing
children's right to loss of parental consortium claims).
240. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (enumerating rights that children currently
possess that were not law when District of Columbia courts first encountered child's claim for
loss of parental consortium).
241. See supra note 193 and accompanying text (discussing recognition of children as per-
sons deserving of constitutional rights).
242. See Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811,819 (D.C. Cir.) (recognizing wife's right to
spousal consortium), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950), overruled on other grounds, 242 F.2d 220
(1956) (concerning interpretation of Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act).
243. See id at 815-19 (discussing arguments that injuries to wives are too remote, conse-
quential, or problematic in ascertaining damages); see also Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 14-
17, 303 N.W.2d 424, 426-27 (1981) (dismissing reasons not to adopt child's cause of action
for loss of parental consortium).
244. See Theama v. City of Kenosha, 117 Wis. 2d 508, 344 N.W.2d 513, 520 (1984) (stat-
ing recovery for loss of spousal consortium involves damages that are just as intangible as
those involved for parental consortium).
245. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (providing jury instructions as solution to
double recovery problem).
